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ABSTRACT 
 “Efforts to improve our school system must start with equity” (Department of 
Education’s Equity and Excellence Commission, 2012). This study is a statistical analysis 
of the 2003-2012 Minnesota K-12 pubic school general education (foundation) formula 
in regard to fiscal equality and wealth neutrality. The analysis utilizes a longitudinal 
approach to compare the findings of previous equity studies to current relatable data as it 
pertains to the State of Minnesota. A number of modifications have been imposed on the 
original Minnesota funding formula over the past decade. This study tests the equity level 
of a selected number of revenue sources and reviews previous studies to determine how 
equity has or has not been improved as a result of the modifications. 
 Fiscal neutrality is described as the wealth of the school district and should be a 
function of the wealth of the state as a whole, not of the wealth of the local school 
district. This study analyzed the fiscal neutrality of 333 public school districts in 
Minnesota in terms of variance, permissible variance, coefficient of variation, and Gini 
Coefficient. The analysis was based upon three research questions: 
1. Based on an analysis of the 2003 to 2012 general education formula, what 
were the fiscal equality and wealth neutrality characteristics of Minnesota’s 
school districts? 
2. Based on an examination of like data elements from the four major Minnesota 
fiscal equality and wealth neutrality studies, what trends can be observed? 
xiii 
3. Based on the recommendations of previous studies, what legislative impact 
did they have? 
The findings of the research show that overall the disbursements of revenue 
through the Minnesota funding formula do meet the standards of wealth neutrality.  
However, there are categories of the formula that remain inequitable and the reliance of 
local taxpayers on the referendum revenue source has increased over the years studied. 
 
Key terms:  fiscal equity, wealth neutrality, horizontal equity, vertical equity, public 
school funding
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE ISSUE OF EDUCATION FUNDING EQUITY 
 
 In 1938, North Dakota Governor William Lange addressed the perceived 
inequalities in public education funding by asking, “Why should the school children in 
the one-room school houses on the prairie not enjoy the same privilege of education as 
those that are more fortunate by living in the larger cities in the state?” (Robinson, 1996 
p.64). Lange’s question highlighted the funding inequalities that often result when 
property taxes are used as the main source of revenue. Although the statement was made 
over eighty years ago, the issue of funding equality is still prevalent across the United 
States.  
Bob Wise, President of The Alliance for Excellent Education, believes equality to 
be a moral imperative. In 2012, Wise said, “It is a moral imperative to equitably provide 
all students with a quality education” (Alliance for Excellent Education, 2012, p.1). Wise 
further addressed the issue in a Huffington Post interview in 2013. He stated:  
Historically, inequality in education has been a moral issue, but the nation’s moral 
failure to provide all children with an adequate and equal education did not incur 
a noticeable cost. That is no longer the case. Today, providing a quality, equitable 
education to all students is no longer solely a moral imperative; it’s also an 
economic imperative (para.10). 
2 
As society continues to progress and change, obtaining a quality education will be 
a vital factor of a successful future, both as individuals and as a society.  A recent report 
by McKinsey & Company estimated that bringing the lower performing states economy 
up to the national average between the years 1983 to 1998 would have added $425 billion 
to possibly $710 billion to the 2008 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Epstein, 2011). 
 Litigations regarding the adequacy and equity of educational funding have used 
the findings in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  Chief Justice Warren expressed in 
his dissent: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments…It is the very foundation of good citizenship…It is doubtful that 
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken 
to provide it, is a right, which must be made available to all on equal term (p. 7). 
Since 1954, 45 of the 50 states in the United States of America have been faced 
with lawsuits challenging their funding formulas. Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, 
Nevada, and Utah are the only states that have not been confronted with a challenge 
(National Access Network, 2012). However, Nevada is currently facing growing 
opposition in regard to funding equality based in part on the state’s consistently low level 
of funding for English-language learners. Several groups have appealed to the state’s 
judicial branch to declare the educational funding policies inadequate and 
unconstitutional; thereby mandating the state to adopt equitable funding throughout 
Nevada (Doughman, 2013).  
3 
One could argue that inequitable funding was a precipitating factor in the 
September 2012 teachers’ strike in Chicago. In regard to the conflict between the 
Chicago Teacher’s Union and the Chicago Public School System, Miller (2012) wrote an 
article for Bloomberg News Press highlighting the inequalities in Illinois’ funding 
formula. Miller pointed out that two-thirds of school finance came from local taxes and 
also noted the disparity between the community of New Trier and the city of Chicago. He 
found that New Trier had 7.5 times the property wealth per pupil than the city of 
Chicago.  New Trier was also taxing its residents’ property at roughly half of Chicago’s 
rate vastly generated more money per pupil. Poorer districts that rely on state aid more 
than property taxes face greater budgetary impacts as a result of state cuts. Those 
inequities are not exclusive to Illinois. 
 Rebell, Odden, Rolle, and Guthrie (2012) examined the impact of school level 
funding cuts on school funding formulas for the journal Educational Leadership using the 
state of New York as an example. They found if the state cuts aid by 10% overall, a poor 
district that receives 75% of its money from state aid loses 7.5 percent of its total budget. 
Conversely, a wealthy district that gets 10% of its revenue from the state and 90% from 
local property taxes only lost 1% of its total budget due to a 10% state cut. Rebell et al.’s 
analysis is one of many examples of the inequities that occur when property valuations 
are used in funding public schools. 
 The Center on Budget Policy Priorities examined how the economic climate has 
affected k-12 public school funding across the country. Based upon inflation-adjusted 
revenue levels, the Center’s analysis found that 37 states provided less funding per 
student in fiscal year 2012 than 2011. State funding in Minnesota decreased 7.7%, equal 
4 
to $727 less per student (Oliff & Leachman, 2011). Overall, 49 states reduced state 
appropriations for public elementary and secondary education for at least one fiscal year 
from 2009-2012 (Driscoll & Salmon, 2013).  
 The State of Minnesota has not been immune to litigation challenging the equality 
of its funding. Two major court cases, Van Dusartz v. Hatfield (1971) and Skeen v. State 
of Minnesota (1993) sought to prove the state’s funding formula was unconstitutional and 
inequitable. The 1971 case resulted in the “Minnesota Miracle,” which was designed to 
bring the state closer to full state funding of K-12 public education. In the Skeen case, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found that although the state’s funding formula was not 
necessarily equitable, it was nevertheless constitutional. Both cases and their effects on 
the state’s funding formula are examined in Chapter II. 
 The disparities and inequalities within Minnesota school systems still exist today. 
For example, 65% of Minnesota districts in 1993 voted in favor of local referendums to 
raise educational funds. By 2011, that number had risen to 89.6% (Hawkins, 2011). 
Because a local referendum is based on property taxes, the wealth of a district can 
dramatically affect the amount of money raised. For instance, within the Minnetonka 
Public School System, a tax of $225 on a $100,000 property value brought in revenue of 
$1,860 per pupil unit. That same $225 tax; however, brought in only $997 per pupil unit 
in Fridley, MN (Schools for Equity in Education, 2012). This example illustrates the 
difficulty in equitably funding schools across the state when the wealth of the district is 
one of the determining factors.  
 In a face-to-face meeting with Tom Melcher, Minnesota Department of Education 
Finance Director (personal communication, September 21, 2010), this researcher 
5 
addressed the effect that the economic climate has on the Minnesota funding formula. 
Melcher stated that no real increase to the funding formula had taken place since the 
2008-09 school year, which has resulted in a greater reliance on local referendum levies. 
In addition, there has been a reduction in school cash flow as the state moved from a 90-
10 payment delay schedule to a 70-30 delay for fiscal year 2011. Melcher believes the 
weakness in the current funding formula is the lack of inflationary increases and the 
erosion of the equalization of tax levies in recent years.  
 The 70-30 delay involves the timing of the state’s disbursement of funding 
revenues to school districts. In such a schedule, the state pays 70% of revenue during the 
current school year and the other 30% the following year. Minnesota transitioned to a 63-
37 shift in revenue for fiscal year 2012, which resulted in many school districts having to 
borrow money to meet their budgetary needs. For example, the Moorhead Area School 
District borrowed $8.5 million during the 2011-12 school year (W. Kazmierczak 
Assistant Superintendent of Business Services Moorhead Area School District, personal 
communication, October 25, 2012).  
 The inequity in Minnesota’s funding has been the subject of four dissertation 
studies: Carruth (1980), Wilson (1984), Jacobson (1986), and Vandal (1997). These 
authors all concluded that based on the state’s fiscal equity and wealth neutrality, 
Minnesota’s public school funding has displayed inequities. Vandal’s study of the 
funding from the 1993-94 fiscal year is nearly twenty years old. Many reforms have 
taken place to the state’s funding formula since that research was conducted. A detailed 
description of the 2011-12 Minnesota funding formula will be summarized in Chapter II, 
as well as a comparative analysis of the previous equity studies.  
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 Figure 1 displays a small number of of the modifications that have occurred to 
Minnesota funding directly affecting the funding formula since the Vandal (1997) study.  
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 The impact of these reforms on the equity of the funding formula remains the 
subject of speculation and dispute. In February of 2011, Minnesota Governor Dayton 
released his 7-Point Plan for Achieving Excellence for all Minnesota Students. Adequate 
education funding for the future was the number one priority (Dayton, 2011). Because of 
this priority, the Education Finance Working Group was formed to find a solution to meet 
this demand.  The Education Finance Working Group membership consisted of 
superintendents, school board members, finance directors, parent advocates, Minnesota 
Department of Education employees, and state legislators.  The working group, led by 
Dr. Brenda Cassellius, Commissioner of Education, recommended improving the 
adequacy, equity, and stability of pre k-12 education funding (The Education Finance 
Working Group, 2011).  
Statement of the Problem 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of policy change on fiscal 
equity and wealth neutrality in Minnesota between fiscal year 2003 and 2012. The study 
also compares previous equity studies to current statistical trends within the state. All 
public school districts in Minnesota are included in this analysis, which used the same 
measures of fiscal equality.  Vandal as well used wealth neutrality in his 1997 
dissertation study. The current study was based on three research questions: 
1. Based on an analysis of the 2003 to 2012 general education formula, what 
were the fiscal equality and wealth neutrality characteristics of Minnesota’s 
school districts? 
2. Based on an examination of like data elements from the four major Minnesota 
fiscal equality and wealth neutrality studies, what trends can be observed? 
9 
3. Based on the recommendations of previous studies what legislative impact did 
they have? 
Significance of the Study 
Despite two court cases regarding the constitutionality of the Minnesota funding 
formula, the “Minnesota Miracle”, and numerous reforms to the formula including the 
elimination of the general education levy, attention is still being focused on the way the 
state of Minnesota funds its public school systems.  
 Four dissertation studies have been completed about the equity of Minnesota’s 
funding formula. The most recent study was completed by Greg Vandal (1997) before the 
state faced a period of prolonged and tenuous economic hardship. By studying the fiscal 
years of 2003 through 2012, this researcher was able to draw conclusions regarding the 
progress the state of Minnesota has made in terms of funding formula equity.  
Delimitations 
The study focused on revenue sources as they related to fiscal equality and wealth 
neutrality within the state of Minnesota. The following are delimitations of the study: 
1. Only Minnesota’s public school districts that were in operation during 2011-
12 were included.  The study focused on the inputs (revenue) the school 
districts received through the Minnesota funding formula. An analysis of how 
revenue sources for each public school district were budgeted and spent by 
local school districts in terms of outputs was not included. Consequently, 
building debt service and capital equipment improvements were not analyzed. 
2. The analysis focused on the basic general education formula, referred to as the 
Weighted Adjusted Daily Membership (WADM), basic skills revenue, 
10 
sparsity revenue, equity revenue, transition revenue, and referendum revenue 
for fiscal years 2003 to 2012.  The state’s disbursement of funds to local 
school districts was studied; however, the system of taxation the state of 
Minnesota used to raise the revenue was not.  
3. Fiscal equity and wealth neutrality as measures of distribution of resources 
was examined. Adequacy and efficiency as use of resources was not analyzed. 
Definition of Terms and Acronyms  
 The terms used in this study are consistent with terms used in fiscal equity and 
public school funding. Similarities were discussed between the previous studies to 
compare the current study with the findings of Larson’s results.  
• Actual Pupil Units. The average daily membership counts, which have been 
weighted, that are multiplied by the state-established weighting factors. These 
factors have changed as the legislature has adjusted the school funding 
formula from year to year. 
• ANTC (Adjusted Net Tax Capacity). The net tax capacity of a school district 
as adjusted by the sales ratio. 
• ADM (Average Daily Membership). The sum for all pupils based on the 
number of days in the district’s school year each pupil is enrolled divided by 
the number of days the school is in session. 
• Basic General Education Revenue. The largest foundation program 
component, this consists of the combination of state aid and local levy (the 
General Education Formula Allowance) multiplied by the Pupil Units. The 
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result is the total amount of Basic General Education Revenue available to the 
school district. 
• Basic Skills Revenue. A combination of compensatory, limited English 
proficiency (LEP), and LEP concentration revenues. 
• Categorical Aid. Funds paid by the state to school districts and designated for 
specific purposes such as transportation, special education for children with 
disabilities, and vocational education. 
• Equality of Educational Opportunity. The provision of equal access to at least 
minimally adequate school resources.  
• Equalizing Factor. The maximum amount of adjusted net tax capacity 
(ANTC) per pupil unit a district may receive. 
• Fiscal Disparity. A standard or criterion of equity, which implies that 
disparities in per pupil unit revenues or expenditures must be reduced or 
eliminated to achieve fairness and equal educational opportunity.  
• Fiscal Year. The 12-month period between settlements of financial accounts. 
The fiscal year for Minnesota school districts runs from July 1 to June 30. 
• Formula Allowance. The dollar amount per pupil unit used to calculate each 
district’s basic general revenue of the formula. 
• General Education Aid. Funds paid by the state to school districts as part of 
the general revenue program. General education aid has been traditionally 
referred to as foundation aid. 
• Levy. A tax imposed on property. A levy certified in the late fall is collected 
in the calendar year beginning the following January. 
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• Local Effort. The amount of revenue provided by local taxation. 
• Pupil Units. A weighted count of resident pupils in average daily membership 
used in the calculation of state aid and local tax levies. 
• Referendum Revenue. A specific revenue increase over the general education 
formula allowance in which the voters of a school district in a special election 
have approved. 
• Resident WADM (actual pupil units). For any school district, the average 
daily membership (ADM) of all students who were district residents, weighted 
according to current statute. In 2012, weighting was as follows in Minnesota: 
kindergarten at .612, grades 1-3 at 1.115, grades 4-6 at 1.06, and grades 7-12 
at 1.3.  
• Sales Ratio. A statistical measure prepared by the Minnesota Department of 
Revenue that measures the difference between the actual sales prices of 
property and the local tax assessor’s market value on those properties. 
• Supplemental Revenue. Combinations of levy and aid in the same ratio as the 
district’s general education revenue. Supplemental revenue is guaranteed to be 
the same amount per pupil as was in place in a given district the previous year. 
Beginning in fiscal year 2003-04, this source was renamed “transition 
revenue” due to the elimination of the general education revenue. 
• Tax Capacity Percentages. The statutory classification that applies to market 
value. 
• Tax Capacity Rate. Each district’s tax levy amount divided by the district’s 
total tax capacity. Tax capacity replaces the term “mill levy.” 
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• Total General Education Revenue. The sum of all revenue components from 
the state’s funding formula. 
• Total WADM. The weighted average daily membership of all district 
residents plus nonresidents who attend the district’s schools. 
• Wealth Neutrality. A standard or criterion of equity based on the concept that 
“the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the 
wealth of the state as a whole” (Coons, Clune III, & Sugarman, 1970, p.2). 
Under wealth neutrality, it is allowable for the level of educational services 
provided by a school district to be a function of local willingness to tax as 
long as equal tax rates provide equal dollars.  
• WADM (Weighted Average Daily Membership). The average daily 
membership, which has been weighted according to the statutory standards.  
Conclusion 
Chapter II follows with a literature review relating to the field of school finance 
equity, both on a state and national level. It includes a historical review of policies 
surrounding funding public schools and any corresponding legal implications regarding 
funding equity. Chapter III details the research methodology used to analyze the fiscal 
equity and wealth neutrality of the 2011-12 Minnesota funding formula. Chapter IV 
includes a detailed description of the findings of this study in terms of fiscal equity and 
wealth neutrality. Chapter V provides a summary, conclusion, and recommendations for 
action developed from the results of the study. It is expected that this study will add to the 
ongoing discussion regarding equitable disbursements of revenue in Minnesota and help 
inform future decisions regarding the funding of the state’s public school districts. 
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Chapter II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 Chapter II contains a summary of the literature relating to the financial equity of 
k-12 public school funding. The review includes research on the funding that school 
districts receive based on the funding formula structures and how the corresponding 
characteristics of the funding formula relate to financial equity.  
 This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section is a literature 
review of the different funding formula structures used to disperse revenues to local 
public school districts through state level funding formulas. A sub-section includes a 
review of different statistical equity measures that can be used to analyze the funding 
formula. The second section relates to forces that create inequity or equity on funding 
formulas. The section is further divided into three sub categories that have a direct impact 
on k-12 education funding: a national perspective of state level litigations on funding 
formulas, local control of education, and the ability of politics to modify/change the 
funding formula. Lastly, the third section contains a review of the research that directly 
relates to the state of Minnesota. The section begins with a review of some of the history 
of k-12 public school funding, followed by a study of the major lawsuits brought against 
the state based on public education funding. The final section concludes with a review of 
the 2011-12 funding formula characteristics. 
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Funding Formula Structures 
 The structure of funding formulas can differ from state to state. Individual state 
legislatures are free to choose the funding structure they feel disperses the funds most 
equitably. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that education is not a fundamental right in the national 
constitution. This ruling did; however, say that it was the state’s responsibility to choose 
the funding structure.  
 Jordan and Lyons (1992) argued there are four essential questions to be answered 
in regard to school finance: (a) what or who to fund, (b) what amount to fund, (c) where 
to get the money, and (d) how to share the funding among different levels of government. 
How a state chooses to answer these questions in large part determines the equity of 
funding across school districts.  
One of the most difficult questions to answer is typically where to get the money. 
Historically, funding to local k-12 public school districts has been accomplished through 
four main structures: flat grants, foundation plans, equalizing plans, and full state 
funding. Each structure will be reviewed separately in detail.  
Flat Grants 
Flat grants are the earliest form of k-12 public school funding. In a flat grant, the 
state merely multiplies the average daily attendance (ADA) or average daily membership 
(ADM) by a fixed amount (Brimley & Garfield, 2005). The flat grant does not take into 
account any concerns regarding local ability to raise funds or the differences in educating 
students. Local public school districts receive the same amount of money per a 
designated characteristic. In Vandal’s (1997) study, he noted that:  
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Flat grants and payments violated many principles of equity and fiscal neutrality; 
that is, the wealth of the community shall not determine the education of a child. 
As such, rich districts received the same payment per unit of measure as poor 
districts (p.27). 
Because flat grants do not consider any mitigating circumstances in regard to individual 
school districts, the payments often magnify already existing inequalities. 
Foundation Program 
A second structure that has been used in funding formulas is a foundation plan, 
which is the most widely used funding structure. Verstegen and Kneppel (2012) 
conducted a funding structure analysis in 2012 and found that 45 states use some form of 
a foundation program. The foundation plan originated in 1923 within the school finance 
theory of George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig (as cited in Brimley & Garfield, 2005). 
Their research focused on the equitable distribution of funds between poor and rich 
school districts and the pair advocated for a minimum amount of funding concept. This 
concept had several fundamental standards: 
1. Funding would be built around the “rich district” idea. Each district would 
levy the amount of local tax that was required to provide a minimum program; 
the state would then kick in the funding needed for the “poor district” to reach 
that minimum program level. 
2. All foundation programs should guarantee equality of educational 
opportunities up to a specific point. 
3. Uniform property assessment across the state is essential in all foundation 
programs. 
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4. The foundation program should be a minimum and not a maximum program. 
Local initiative and increase expenditures about the foundation program must 
be practicable in all districts within a state (Brimley & Garfield, 2005). 
The last component of the Strayer-Haig foundation plan is the section that has 
received the most opposition. Because the plan leaves open the ability of districts to raise 
funds above and beyond the minimum level, it again opens the door for inequities. 
Foundation plans also do not take into account any equalization; therefore, wealthy 
districts could theoretically raise the funds needed to meet the foundation at a lower tax 
rate than a low property value district. Because of this shortcoming, some analysts have 
characterized the foundation plan as an “equalization myth” (Augenblick, Myers, & 
Anderson, 1997). Although the plan appears to have the potential to ensure equity across 
school districts, it inevitably results in the same inequality it was designed to remedy.  
Full State Funding 
A third funding structure and the least used is the full state funding (FSF) 
program. As the title suggests, in a full state funding program all funding comes from the 
state and no local tax revenue can be collected to support education. The only state in the 
country currently using the true form of FSF is Hawaii. This example; however, is 
accomplished because the entire state of Hawaii is one large school district. 
 The state of Washington created a self-described full state-funding plan in 
response to litigation brought against the state in 1978 (Seattle School District No. 1 v 
State, 1978). This litigation dealt directly with the inequities in the abilities for poor 
communities to raise funds in comparison to wealthy districts. At the time of the case, 
some wealthy districts had the ability to raise funds so that up to 24% of their budget 
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came from local taxes, compared to just 8% in a district with low property value. In 
Washington’s plan; however, local school districts could supplement their budgets with 
local levies. Because the districts had the ability to raise local funds, the gap between 
districts actually grew as some property rich districts were able to raise enough funds so 
that up to thirty percent of their budget was from local taxes (Reynolds, 2006).  
 Many argue that full state funding is the most equitable plan because, in its truest 
form, the wealth of the local school district has no relationship to the amount of funding 
it receives. This goes hand in hand with fiscal neutrality. A study conducted in 2009 by 
Reynolds stated that the state has the obligation and sovereign duty to provide for public 
education through taxation. Reynolds stated:  
It is the state constitution’s education clause; however, which explicitly puts the 
duty to provide education on the state and thus answers the question about taxing 
jurisdiction. Purportedly, local taxes for education must be considered as part of 
the state’s implementation of its duty and should be evaluated as state taxes. No 
transfer of the state’s sovereign power to its political subdivisions can change the 
fact that the revenue generated by those taxes is collected furtherance of the 
state’s nondelegable constitutional duty (p.1848). 
Thomas Kleven  (2010) took the idea of full state funding a step further.  He 
expressed a need for full federal funding: 
If states would shoulder the full cost of public education, that could redress the 
inequalities of the present reliance of local financing.  Without federal financing; 
however, the inequalities among states will persist.  So at a minimum federalizing 
public education seems necessary to address those educational inequalities, like 
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school financing, that are beyond state but are within federal control.  
Federalization might be better suited, as well, to address some of the matters 
within state control for reasons of efficiency or due to political factors that impede 
reforms more so at the state than at the federal level (p. 22). 
Equalization 
The fourth funding structure that has been used is the equalizing plan of which 
there are a couple of common types: district power equalizing (DPE) and percentage 
equalizing (PE). Equalization is meant to close the funding gap between property wealthy 
school districts and property poor districts. The theory of equalization has been linked to 
the work done by Cubberley (1906), which said, “All the children of the state are equally 
important and are entitled to the same advantage” (p.49). 
 DPE is the most notable equalizing plan and means that each local district mill 
levy should produce the same number of dollars of total school revenue per mill per 
weighted student in every district and the last mill to be levied should produce the same 
total funds as the first one (Brimley & Garfield, 2005). DPE has been linked to the work 
of Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970). In their book, Private Wealth and Public 
Education, Coons et al. defined DPE as: 
The concrete financing proposal may be stated thus: equal tax rates should 
provide equal spendable dollars. That is, the local unit would be empowered to fix 
the tax rate to be imposed upon a specific class of local wealth. For every level of 
local tax effort permitted by statute, the state would have fixed the number of 
dollars per task unit (probably per pupil) that the district would be empowered to 
spend. The state also guarantees that this number of dollars will be available to 
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the district. If the local levy raises less than the state set amount, the state makes 
up the difference from a fund generated by taxation of general state wealth (p.34).  
Verstegen and Knoeppel (2012) explained that DPE systems support taxpayer 
equity, rather that inequity, by providing equal yields in the form of similar tax rates 
across the state. An example of a DPE plan would be as follows: If a state sets a levy 
dollar amount of $1,000 for a given levy tax rate and if the local school district raises 
only $600 through the set levy tax rate, the state would then offset the amount with $400 
state dollars to reach the state set level. Likewise, if a district reaches or exceeds the 
minimum $1,000 through the set levy tax rate, they would receive no state equalizing 
funding. In some plans, if a local district raises above the minimum level, say $1,250, the 
amount over the state set level would then be taken and debited into the state’s general 
fund. This fund would then be used to pay equalizing dollars to districts under the state 
set level. This is known as recapture or the “Robin Hood” plan.  
Equity Measures 
There have been some equity measures or theories discussed in regard to k-12 
public school funding, regardless of the type of funding structure the state chooses to use. 
This sub-section will look at various parts of this discussion.  
 Since education provisions are included in each state’s constitution, many feel 
that inequitable funding is a violation of the equal protection clause. Essentially, the 
argument can be expressed as, “equity in the context of school finance means the equal 
treatment of persons in equal circumstances . . . equity means that taxes should be equal 
regardless of one’s taxing jurisdiction” (Jordan & Lyons, 1992, p.23). This concept 
relates directly to horizontal equity, which involves equal treatment for equal students. 
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This type of equity does not take the individual characteristics of the students, 
demographics, location, etc. into account, instead assuming all individuals are similar. 
Flat grants and foundation plans that pay on straight, per pupil ADA or ADM are 
examples of horizontal equity. This concept has often been called “the equal treatment of 
equals” in school finance literature (Toutkoushian & Michael, 2007).  
 On the other end of the spectrum is vertical equity, which takes individual 
characteristics into account for funding purposes. This type of equity involves the 
differential treatment of students or the unequal treatment of unequals. An example of 
vertical equity being incorporated into a funding formula would be weighted pupil units 
(WPU) or compensatory funding. In WPU, students are weighted differently based on the 
specific needs of each student. Schools are then funded based on the WPU, rather than 
flat per pupil units.  
 Since vertical equity centers on the concept of differential treatment of unequals, 
it has been associated with the adequacy movement. The Thomas Fordham Institute 
recommended that state policy makers move to a weight student funding plan, stating that 
such a plan allowed for greater equity and would simplify state funding formulas (Petrilli 
& Roza, 2011).   In their article in Educational Leadership, Linda Darling-Hammond and 
Diane Friedlaender (2008) expressed the same opinion on funding through a WPU 
formula.  They wrote that WPU funding reduces the number of small programs and rolls 
funds into core funding through the weighted student formulas so that schools have 
flexibility to align funding to their instructional missions.  Jordan and Lyons (1992) 
found that “delivery of an adequate program does not assume equal per-pupil funding. In 
this case, the concept of vertical equity prevails, since unequal per-pupil funding is 
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needed to provide an adequate program” (p.25).  In addition, King, Swanson, and 
Sweetland (2005) also tied the two together, describing adequacy as “the ideal state of 
vertical equity” (p.2).  
 Another vertical equity example is the Title I provision of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act.  Title I provides additional funding to students attending high-
poverty schools to achieve at the same academic level as their wealthier counterparts.  
The Center for American Progress defined the necessity of the Title I funding were meant 
to enhance educational opportunities for students at high poverty schools (Bireda, 2011).  
In 2011, 34 states had low income or compensatory funding that provided funding based 
on poverty levels (Verstegen, 2011).  
 The last equity measure reviewed is Proposition One, which states, “the quality of 
public education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state” 
(Coons et al., 1970, p.152). This concept is closely related to fiscal neutrality, which 
states a district’s level of funding should be a function of the wealth of the state rather 
than the wealth of the district. In his book Educational Finance: An Economic Approach, 
Monk (1990) defined fiscal neutrality as: “the wealth of the state, as a whole, must be 
behind every student”; this definition was used in the Oklahoma lawsuit regarding fiscal 
equity (as cited in Hancock, 2001 p. 8).  This definition is similar to a Rebell’s (2010) 
definition, which stated, “the state has a constitutional obligation to equalize the value of 
the taxable wealth in each district, so that equal tax efforts will yield equal resources” 
(p.225).  Another way to conceptualize fiscal neutrality is that the principle of equity 
exists perfectly when no relationship exists between equity objects and illegitimate 
characteristics (Houck & Eom, 2012).  
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 If Proposition One and fiscal neutrality could be accomplished, wealth neutrality 
would exist. Wealth neutrality is a statistical measure used to analyze the degree to which 
state and/or local revenue is related to the property wealth of the local school district. The 
wealth-neutrality score shows the degree to which state and local revenues are related to 
the property wealth of districts. A negative score means that poorer districts receive more 
funding per weighted pupil unit than wealth districts. Conversely, a positive score 
indicates more funding for wealthy school districts. Education Week conducted a survey 
entitled Quality Counts at 10, which used the wealth-neutrality score to rate the equity of 
the state funding formula over the years 1997 to 2006. The researchers found that only 
ten states had a negative wealth-neutrality score (National Center for Educational 
Research, 2006).  In another study conducted by Epstein (2001) using wealth neutrality 
equity measures, the state of Minnesota had a ranking of 16th for their wealth neutrality 
score.   
Forces that Affect Equity 
 In the early 1860s, Thaddeus Stevens addressed the issue of equity before the 
United States House of Representatives. Stevens said: 
This law is often objected to because its benefits are shared by the children of 
profligate spendthrift equally with those of the most industrious and economical 
habits. It ought to be remembered that the benefit is bestowed not on the erring 
parents, but the innocent children. Carry out this objection and you punish 
children for the crimes or misfortunes of their parents. You virtually establish 
castles and grades founded on no merit of the particular generation, but on the 
24 
demerits of their ancestors; an aristocracy of the most odious and insolent kind – 
the aristocracy of wealth and power (as cited in Coons et al., 1970, p.5). 
Steven’s statement illustrates the longevity of the battle for equality. It has effectively 
been going on since public schools were created.  
 The second section of this chapter focuses on three issues that directly impact the 
equity of the funding formula. It can be argued that these impacts have both increased the 
equity of state funding of k-12 public education in some situations and led to greater 
inequities in others. The first sub-section looks at past nation-wide litigation in regard to 
state funding. An examination of litigation involving Minnesota appears later in the 
chapter. The second sub-section focuses on the idea of local control, while the last section 
addresses the impact of politics on funding formulas. 
Litigation 
 One of the major forces that have affected the equity of the funding formulas has 
been the use of litigation. According to the National Access Network (2012), cases 
involving the constitutionality of k-12 public school funding have occurred in 45 states 
across the country. Of those cases, 19 plaintiffs won their case at the Supreme Court level 
(Minorini & Sugarman, 1999). As of July 2012, 15 states are in the process of addressing 
litigation regarding their funding formulas (National Access Network, 2012).  
 As stated previously, five states have never been part of a lawsuit regarding 
school funding: Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah. Larry Newton, School 
Finance Director for the State of Utah, believes that litigation has not occurred because 
the Utah constitution does not contain any language regarding adequacy, instead 
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discusses the concept in terms of a “reasonably equal school” and minimum school 
programs (personal communication, March 21, 2011).  
The remaining states have all faced lawsuits, many states doing so several times. 
For example, Texas’ finance system has been challenged six times since 1984, most 
recently in 2005 (Wieder, 2012). Many of these cases have resulted in policy 
modifications that have had a major impact on public school funding.  
One such case was San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in 1973, 
in which plaintiffs from some of the property poor districts across Texas sued the state 
claiming that the funding formula was unconstitutional because of the resulting 
disparities among districts. The Supreme Court rejected their argument stating that 
education was not a fundamental interest under the federal constitution. In his descent; 
however, Justice Thurgood Marshall specifically recommended that the plaintiffs address 
their concerns at the state level through a “review of state educational funding schemes 
under state constitution provisions” (San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriquez, 1973). The Supreme Court’s decision had a major impact on future litigation, 
effectively opening the door to state level lawsuits regarding the funding of public 
schools. 
 A second major court case that helped create more equity in school funding 
occurred two years earlier in Serrano v. Priest (1971). In Serrano v. Priest (1971), the 
California Supreme Court ruled that education was a fundamental constitutional right and 
that the funding disparities between property wealthy and property poor districts 
generated by the state funding formula violated the equal protection clause.  A 
continuation of the lawsuit was filed in 1976 with Serrano vs. Priest II. Once again, the 
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court sided with plaintiffs, stating “equality of educational opportunities requires that all 
school districts possess the ability in terms of revenue to provide students with 
substantially equal opportunities for learning” (Serrano v. Priest, 1976, p.6). Both of 
these cases established a precedent for future litigation involving funding equity. 
 Another case involving equal educational opportunity involved the state of 
Connecticut in Horton v. Meskill (1977), wherein the Connecticut Supreme Court found 
the funding of public schools in the state unconstitutional. The ruling stated that the state 
constitution required it “to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity” 
(National Access Network, 2010, para.1). Like the Serrano ruling, the court educational 
equity was determined to be a right of all state residents, not a luxury. 
 A 1997 New Hampshire lawsuit further addresses equal funding, this time 
directing its litigation on property taxes. In Claremont School District v. Governor 
(1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs who argued 
against the state’s disparities in funding. The court concluded that because the duty to 
provide education is a state and not a local matter, any property tax levied for schools is a 
state tax and not a local tax. Furthermore, it was the state’s obligation to provide a 
minimum standard of education. The court’s ruling; however, left open the opportunity 
for local schools to rise above the minimum, stating that once the minimum standard is 
satisfied, local districts may levy property taxes to generate supplemental funding. 
 The New Hampshire ruling addressed the discrepancies of using property taxes as 
well and stated that the state had an obligation to a minimum standard of funding. By 
allowing school districts to raise funds above the minimum level; however, the court left 
the door open for future funding discrepancies.  
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This court ruling is one factor that began a litigation shift away from equity 
towards adequacy and fairness. The case of Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt (1993) 
best describes this shift. The plaintiffs in this case filed suit challenging the state’s 
education finance system on adequacy and equity grounds. Although spending levels 
were equal across all districts, Alabama students were performing at the bottom of the 
nation academically. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both the adequacy and 
equity claims based on the state constitution. In this example, although a funding system 
may be equitable, it may also be inadequate (Hanushek, 2006).  Mason & Arsen (2010) 
explained the adequacy through their research through results:  “If resources and results 
are both significantly lower, then the court will find the education in those districts is 
inadequate” (p. 32). 
 In a report in the Cornell Law Review, Gillespiet (2010, p.1004-1006) explained 
the advantages of moving to adequacy-based litigations. She found three advantages of 
an adequacy over equity lawsuit: 
1. Adequacy is normally more appealing and consistent with widely held societal 
values. 
2. Adequacy allows for continued local control of public education. 
3. Adequacy directly focuses on the quality of education the state provides. 
The shift toward adequacy litigation was further addressed in a policy brief 
written by Lefkowits (2004) for Mid-Continent Research for Education and Learning. 
Lefkowits stated that: 
These lawsuits tend to be more politically palatable than equity suits, which by 
their nature, result in a redistribution of resources from high-wealth to low-wealth 
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districts. Adequacy suits seek a higher level of funding for all students and thus 
avoid pitting districts against one another (p.5). 
 West & Peterson (2012) agreed with this claim.  They stated the difficulty with 
moving to adequacy was rather simply asking for fiscal equity. Advocates for poor school 
districts argued that spending on education must be adequate to provide all students with 
an education guaranteed by their state’s constitution.  Having set aside the simple, readily 
justifiable standard of fiscal equity, plaintiffs now had to give specificity to educational 
adequacy, a much more ambiguous concept.   
 Not all; however, agreed that moving to adequacy was the right decision. 
Kauffman (2004) argued that unless you can have both equity and adequacy, equity is the 
better option. He said, “Absent this combination of both equity and adequacy, it is 
preferable that equity be given priority. If an equitable system is inadequately funded, all 
schools are equally vested in raising the level of support to an adequate level” (p.26).  
 A recent decision by the Colorado Supreme Court may have further diminished 
the adequacy claim. In the case of State of Colorado v. Labato (2013), the court found in 
favor of the state funding formula stating that schools may be underfunded, but the state’s 
system for parceling out revenues did not violate the constitution. In the ruling, Justice 
Nancy Rice stated:  
While the trial court’s detailed findings of fact demonstrates that the current 
public school financing system might not be ideal policy, this Court’s task is not 
to determine whether a better financing system could be devised, but rather to 
determine whether the system passes constitutional muster (State v. Lobato, 2013, 
para.13). 
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 Springer, Liu & Guthrie (2008), analyzed the question of whether an adequacy 
lawsuit or an equity lawsuit will bring greater funding and resources.  Their research 
analyzed the resource distribution from the state funding formula after an adequacy 
and/or equity lawsuit.  They concluded, “contrary to school finance theory, resource 
distribution patterns following court-mandated equity and adequacy reforms are not 
statistically different” (p. 61-62).  The adequacy versus equity debate was also researched 
by Erin Buzuvis (1998) who concluded that the best reform efforts must strive for both 
adequacy and equity:  “The experiences of these two states (New Hampshire and 
Vermont) suggest that regardless of the catalyst for reform, education reform can and 
should include elements of both equity and adequacy” (p. 92). 
Local Control 
 It has long been a fundamental provision of our democracy that control stay with 
the people opposed to the federal government. This ideology includes the control of 
education. Historically, the fundamental policies of education have been created by the 
state and local educational agencies. This ideology; however, can lead to increased 
inequities. Rebell (2010) explained the equity problem associated with local control:  
Rooted in traditional patterns of local control of schooling in America, most state 
systems require much of the funding for public schools to be obtained from local 
property taxes, a method that inherently disadvantaged students who attend 
schools in areas that had low property wealth (p.221). 
 This concept was further discussed in a report commissioned by the Education 
Law Center via Baker, Sciarra, and Farrie, Is School Funding Fair (2010). The report 
stated, “Public education in the United States is highly centralized, provided through 
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separate systems by the fifty states” (p.2). This decentralization can be argued to have a 
negative impact on the equity of public school funding due to the fact that some local 
communities can vote down individual issues and approve others. The issue of 
decentralization is not new. In his book 1943 book, American Schools: A Critical Study 
of our School System, Morrison (as cited in King, Swanson, & Sweetland, 2005) 
described school districts as “a little republic at every crossroads,” stating that the fact the 
American education system uses extreme decentralization is both its strength and its 
weakness. 
 In regard to funding, local control is centered around the ability of a school 
district to pass a levy on local property taxes to raise revenues for educational purposes. 
Many times, this levy is a supplemental fund in addition to the state level funding the 
district receives. Jordan and Lyons (1992) explained local choice as follows: 
The goal of local choice assumes that the local taxpayers and the school board 
should have the authority to establish the budget and set the tax levy for operating 
the schools. This tradition of local choice has resulted in a wide disparity in per-
pupil expenditures among states and among districts within states (p.25). 
This has created a battle between equity and local choice. Reynolds (2006) defined the 
battle in the Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School 
Finance Reform. She said:  
As long as local taxing and funding provide a significant portion of school 
revenues, some districts can tax themselves at the rate necessary to provide their 
children, and only their children, with a school system that is public in nature but 
private in its level of luxury (p.1884). 
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Giles (2012) agreed with Reynolds’ (2006) opinion on the privatization of public 
education, She stated that well-funded schools are in the position to tap into their affluent 
parents and the surrounding community to finance the “extras” that parents may value 
and believe will make a significant difference in their children’s education lives. Giles 
argued that the privatization of public schools effectively institutionalizes inequity in the 
school systems. 
 The argument of local control and voter approval may best be described in a study 
conducted by Educational Testing Services (ETS) (Hart & Teeter, 2004). ETS analyzed 
public opinion on various school funding issues, including the prospect of increasing 
school funding by raising taxes in order to ensure equitable and stable schools. Fifty 
percent of respondents stated they would agree with an increase, while 45% indicated 
they would be opposed to the increase, even if that meant no additional funding for 
schools. It is a common predicament that many school districts face: people want 
adequate and stable school systems, but many do not want the funding coming out of 
their pockets.  
   Court cases have also centered on local control.  In the Ohio Supreme Court 
Case DeRolph vs. State (2002), the opinion expressed the following concern of local 
control:   
However, it is futile to lay the entire blame for inadequacies of the present system 
on the taxpayers and the local boards of education.  Although some districts have 
the luxury of deciding where to allocate extra dollars, many others have the 
burden of deciding which educational programs to cut or what financial institution 
to contact to obtain yet another emergency loan.  Our state constitution makes the 
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state responsible for educating our youth.  Thus, the state should not shirk its 
obligation by espousing clichés about local control (p. 11). 
Political Affects 
In the political environment, state legislatures have had the difficult task of 
balancing competing demands from local school districts with those of state level 
agencies. In a statistical analysis conducted by Metzler (2003), the phrase “Inequitable 
Equilibrium” was coined. In the study, Metzler looked at the relationship between 
changes in school finance systems and the degree to which they achieved greater equity. 
Based on his findings, Metzler hypothesized that “in many states, the distribution of 
education resources is primarily a function of the distribution of political power in the 
state” (p.5).  It can be very difficult, if not impossible, to separate school finance systems 
with the political entities that surround it.   
An examination of the Minnesota Republican Party (2012) and the Minnesota 
Democratic Party (2012) platforms detail this tenuous relationship.  The Republican Party 
for example, holds firm parental choice.  They believe in a more competitive accountable 
public school system, which would supply school vouchers for parents to use for any 
school they choose.  In regard to school funding, they view the current Minnesota 
funding formula too complicated and recommend simplifying the formula by eliminating 
all funding categories as well as eliminating all payments disbursed to school districts 
based on students that receive free or reduced funding.  Another belief is that elimination 
of the U.S. Department of Education, placing all authority with the local school boards.   
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In contrast, the Democratic Party agrees that the practice of differing state funding 
should be opposed.  They support federal and state government fully funding all 
programs that are mandated to local school districts.  Another belief is providing early 
childhood education for every child in Minnesota, by contrast the Republican Party is 
firmly against the establishment of universal pre-school programs.  Teacher rights, is also 
an area that the parties are at opposites ends of the spectrum.  Democrats support the 
protection of professional rights and collective bargaining for educators, where the 
Republicans support pay based on performance and limiting educators right to strike.  
These opposing philosophical differences can be a pawn during a legislative session 
when reviewing k-12 public school funding. 
The state of Kansas is another example of a system with inequitable equilibrium.  
Kansas permits the 16 districts with the most expensive residential properties to levy a 
special local tax to raise additional revenue on the basis that it costs more to hire teachers 
in neighborhoods with high priced houses (Baker & Cororan, 2012). 
 The idea of political power has appeared in court cases as well. In Campaign for 
Fiscal Equality v. State (2001), the plaintiffs claimed that the State of New York had 
violated its constitutional mandate to support of a system of free common schools, 
wherein all the children of the state may be educated, by establishing an education 
financing system that failed to afford New York City’s public schoolchildren the 
opportunity guaranteed by the Constitution. The court ruled that over many years, the 
state had consistently violated the Education Article of the Constitution, stating: 
The evidence at trial demonstrated that the formulas do not operate neutrally to 
allocate school funds—at least with respect to annual increases in State aid. 
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Rather the formulas are manipulated to conform to budget agreements reached by 
the Governor, the Speaker of the State Assembly, and the Senate Majority Leader 
(p. 9-10). 
This case demonstrates the innate inability to separate political interests from school 
finance issues. 
 One state has taken action to try to minimize political involvement in school 
finance. Arizona’s Proposition 105, also known as the Voter Protection Act, was passed 
in 1998 and includes a provision that forbids lawmakers from repealing or changing the 
intent of approved ballot measures without majority approval from the legislature 
(Fischer, 2013). The amendment that appears in Section 1, Article IV, Part 1, Section 1, 
6(b) reads as follows: “The Legislature shall not have the power to repeal a referendum 
measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon or to repeal a referendum 
measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon” (para.7). Although a positive 
step, the amendment didn’t prevent Arizona’s legislature from modifying the state’s 
funding formula, in particular the student count process. In 2010, the legislature voted to 
move from an average daily membership to an average daily attendance.  
In the Journal of Education Finance, Ely & Fermanich (2013) commented on this 
switch in student count, saying: 
Politically, policymakers electing to adopt a high incentive count method may 
face accusations of cutting funding for education because averaged counts and 
counts based on attendance will inevitably be lower than a discrete count taken 
early in the school year or counts using enrollment (p.366). 
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Ultimately, modifications to the funding formula often result in increased inequity, 
especially when the motivation for change is based on political concerns and not issues of 
equity. 
 Arizona is not the only state whose funding formula has been scrutinized. In a 
study of the Massachusetts education funding system, Fahy (2011) looked at how funding 
formula modification affected the equity of the formula. She concluded that systems that 
include district characterizations such as community wealth and regional school systems 
are more likely to result in inequities. Roza (2010) further addressed the issue in her book 
Educational Economics: Where Do School Funds Go? Roza referenced a quote from a 
member of the Learning Assistance Program in the state of Washington to illustrate the 
issues regarding allocating additional funds to poor students: 
We had what we thought was the perfect formula. We ran all the numbers 
showing how much each district would get. We had it all in a clean report with all 
the information on how and why we designed the formula. Problem was, when we 
brought the report back to the larger state legislature, each and every 
representative started out by thumbing through the report. They went right past 
the per pupil allocations. Then, they stopped when they got to the sums that their 
district would get. That’s when it all fell apart (p.1017). 
This example illustrates the difficulties that can arise when politics and 
educational policy becomes intertwined. Despite the best of intentions, individual needs 
often trump those of the whole and make equity difficult to achieve.  
 Another concern that has risen from the politics of the funding formulas is the 
concept of municipal overburden which has been defined as “the relationship between 
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municipalities’ education funding and the fiscal stress generated by their heavy 
expenditures on both educational and non-education services” (Knickman & Reschovsky, 
1981 p.353).  The overburden is likely to increase as states are asked to spend more of 
their budget on educational related expenses. For the 2009 fiscal year, states averaged 
23.3% of their entire budget on k-12 education (LaPlante, 2012). As the federal 
government continues to face financial challenges, public education funding is likely to 
be an area where cuts are made. Consequently, states will be forced to contribute a higher 
percentage of their overall budget to education, resulting in additional municipal 
overburden.  
 The idea of municipal overburden has been used in a number of state finance 
challenges. For example, a three-judge panel ruled in 2013 that the Kansas Legislature 
had failed to live up to its constitutional duty to adequately fund public schools and 
ordered an increase of more than $500 million. The attorneys for the state argued that the 
cuts were necessary to provide all the state services required by law. The Kansas Center 
for Economic Growth said lower school funding would hurt the state’s economic 
recovery. “Good schools and an educated workforce foster economic growth and we are 
shooting ourselves in the foot by reducing our investment in our schools and students,” 
said Annie McKay, the group’s executive director (as cited in Hancock, 2013, para.11). 
The case is currently awaiting an appeal with the Kansas Supreme Court. 
 A 2011 review of state finances conducted by the National Governor’s 
Association found that as a result of the national recession, eighteen states made cuts to 
k-12 funding, totaling $1.8 billion (Education Week, 2011). Many of these cuts were 
likely the result of states attempting to minimize municipal overburden. The impact of 
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municipal overburdens; however, is not without its distracters. A study conducted by 
Brazer & McCarty (1986) found that the municipal overburden hypothesis was not a 
valid or reasonable basis upon which to claim the need for special assistance.  
History of Minnesota Finance 
In 1858, the Minnesota Constitution made it the duty of the state to ensure it 
would have a thorough and efficient system of public schools. In Article 13, Section 1, it 
states: 
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the 
intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and 
uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by 
taxation and otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient systems of public 
schools throughout the state.  
The final section of this chapter includes a review of the history of k-12 public 
school funding in Minnesota. The review focuses on specific regulations that directly 
impact the funding formula, either by creating more equity or by resulting in greater 
inequities. Much of the timeline was taken from the Minnesota Department of 
Education’s website (Melcher, 2011).  
 The property tax levy law was passed in 1887. This initial levy was to be 
allocated to schools in proportion to the number of pupils in attendance, much like ADA 
now. Schools that had students in attendance at least forty days with a qualified teacher 
were eligible for funds. The property tax levy continued to be the bulk of revenue for 
public schools for the next 25 plus years.  
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 In 1915, the state executed their first attempt at equalization in the form of 
supplemental aid. School districts that had a maintenance levy that exceeded 20 mills 
were eligible for aid equal to one third of the amount raised about the 20-mill rate. This 
supplemental aid was capped at a total of $1,800 for a graded (elementary) school and 
$2,500 for a high school. 
 The initial equalization was amended in 1921 with the addition of a second tier of 
support. School districts would still receive one-third of the amount raised between 20 
and 32 mills, but districts with mills that exceeded 32 would also receive one-half of the 
sum raised through the levy with supplemental aid. Districts that raised $100 per pupil; 
however, would be excluded from supplemental aid. The maximum aid level also 
changed to $200 per elementary teacher and $250 per high school and special education 
teacher. This was the first finance law that differentiated between property poor and 
property wealthy districts by not allowing supplemental aid for the districts that could 
raise the funds through their local property taxes. 
 The supplemental aid program remained unchanged until modified in 1935. Now 
the program guaranteed that a school district making a regular maintenance level of 30 
mills would receive $60 per elementary pupil and $100 per high school pupil in regard to 
ADA. Two years earlier, the state had enacted a statewide income tax. This was the first 
tax that would go to the schools directly that was not a property tax. Under the new tax, 
school districts would receive $10 per resident child between the ages of 8 and 16 that 
lived within their boundaries. 
 In 1947, the legislature added a flat grant structure to the funding formula in the 
form of basic aid. For the first time, the basic aid was distributed to school districts 
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through a weighted pupil membership (WPM) program as follows: kindergarten = 0.25, 
elementary = 1.0, and secondary = 1.5. This can be viewed as the first attempt at 
horizontal equity in regard to public school funding.  
 The next big change came as a result of a 1955 study of the school finance system 
by the Bureau of Field Studies at the University of Minnesota. In regard to the current 
finance system, the study found that the state was providing 41.7% of the funding to local 
school districts with the remaining 58.3% coming from the school districts themselves. 
Based on their findings, the study recommended the following changes: 
1. Adopt a foundation-type program through the following formula:   
Aid = the greater of ($215 x weighted ADA) – (0.012 x equalized valuation) 
or $92 per pupil unit. 
2. The foundation program of education should be defined (ie: minimum 
services to pupils that should be offered by all schools). 
3. There should be a study of pupil weights. 
4. Increase the state share of state and local school funding to 50%. 
5. Establish a state loan fund for school construction. 
6. Provide state aid to equalize debt service levies that exceed a certain minimum 
tax rate. 
7. Continue to use equalized property values for state aid computations 
 (Melcher, 2011, para.5). 
As a result of the study, the state legislature enacted a foundation program in 
1957, which began in fiscal year 1958. The formula allowance was set at $240 per pupil 
unit which was based on ADA and weighted as kindergarten = 0.5, elementary = 1.0, and 
40 
secondary = 1.5. In addition, the basic levy was set at 16.5 mills times the adjusted 
assessed valuation.  
The various changes to the funding formula did not; however, change the 
disparities in local levies that related to property taxes. For instance, the city of Anoka 
was forced to levy a tax of $581 on a $20,000 home in order to spend $536 per pupil unit. 
Conversely, the city of Golden Valley only had to levy $369 on a similar home to spend 
$837 per pupil unit (Melcher, 2011). The discrepancy led to the first major court case 
against the State of Minnesota and its funding of public schools.  
On October 12, 1971, parents from the White Bear School District filed a 
complaint that charged the current funding system with denying their children 
substantially equal educational opportunities and forcing residents to pay higher tax rates 
for the same or lesser expenditure levels than those in wealthy districts. The case was 
similar in nature to 1971 California Serrano v. Priest case. The plaintiffs in the 
Minnesota case dismissed their claim; however, after the “Minnesota Miracle” Omnibus 
bill was enacted. The district court found that “a system of public school financing which 
makes spending per pupil a function of the school district’s wealth violates the equal 
protection guarantee of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Van 
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 1971). 
The Minnesota Miracle was seen by many as the answer to funding inequities. 
The main components of the bill were: 
1. The total state share of school operating revenues was increased from 45% to 
65%. State taxes increased by 23%, largely through income and state taxes. 
This reduced property taxes by 15-20%.  
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2. The foundation formula allowance increased from $404 to $750 for FY 1973. 
3. Uniform statewide levy limits were created for the first time. The basic tax 
rates were raised from 20 mills to 30 mills. Limits could still be exceeded if 
approved by voters in a referendum. 
4. Pupil units changed from average daily attendance (ADA) to average daily 
membership (ADM). Secondary weighting decreased from 1.5 to 1.4. 
5. A hold-harmless provision was created to ensure that districts with declining 
enrollment would not receive less state aid for FY 1973 than they did in FY 
1972 or 1971. 
The changes in the Minnesota Miracle bill shifted a majority of the funding onto 
the state rather than the local school districts. For the next 15 years, there were no other 
major modifications to the finance structure. In 1987, the foundation revenue plan was 
changed to general education revenue and some categorical aids were created. In 
addition, supplemental revenue was created to ensure that all districts received at least a 
$40 per pupil unit increase in FY 1989 compared to FY 1988.  
Another change introduced in 1988 was the mandatory open enrollment program 
that would begin in FY 1990 for school districts with enrollments greater than 1,000 
students and in FY 1991 for all other districts. This was the first time students could 
attend any school district rather than being confined to the district they resided in. This 
change was important for two reasons. First, the district of the resident would not get the 
general education funding for the students that attended neighboring districts as the 
funding would follow the student to the district of attendance. Second, parents could now 
send their child to a district with high property wealth while continuing to live in a 
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district with low property taxes. The potential ramifications of open enrollment were 
addressed in a report conducted by Knowles and Knowles in 2005: 
Under open enrollment, a homeowner with a preference for higher than average 
spending on public education may nonetheless vote against a local operating 
referendum, since the opportunity to send their child to a high spending school 
outside the district exits (p.5). 
 The year 1991 was another year that saw significant modifications to the funding 
formula when the legislature enacted a Referendum Equalization Program to be 
implemented in FY 1993. This equalizing program mandated that referendum revenue be 
equal to 10% of the formula allowance equalized at 50% of the equalizing factor. The 
problem with this program was that the referendum levy was tied directly to the local 
operating levy of the school district. If the local school district did not have or was not 
able to get voter approval for a levy, that district did not receive any equalizing revenue.  
 In that same year, a debt service plan that would have provided 100% equalization 
of debt levy exceeding a 12% tax rate was vetoed by the Governor’s office. The debt 
service levy became part of a bigger equity issue the following year when the Minnesota 
Supreme Court heard the case of Skeen v. State of Minnesota. The plaintiffs in this case 
filed suit against the state challenging the constitutionality of the referendum and debt 
services levies that are based upon local property taxes and the training, experience, and 
supplemental revenues that are fully equalized state aid components of the general 
education program (Skeen v. State of Minnesota, 1993). The Wright County District 
Court found that the referendum levy, supplemental revenue, and debt services revenue 
violated the education clause and equal protection guarantees of the Minnesota State 
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Constitution. That ruling was overturned; however, when the Minnesota Supreme Court 
ruled education in Minnesota was a fundamental right and the current system of 
education finance satisfied that right. In the court’s opinion, “All plaintiff school districts 
are provided with an adequate level of education which meets or exceeds the state’s basic 
educational requirements and . . . are given sufficient funding to meet their basic needs” 
(Larson, 1993, para. 20). This ruling shifted the idea of equitable funding towards 
adequate funding by effectively saying that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure a 
minimum level of funding. Local districts; however, were permitted to exceed this 
minimum level.  
 Another major change to the finance structure occurred in 2001 when the 
legislature passed a law eliminating the general education levy beginning FY 2003 and 
replacing it with state aid. The general education levy was the district power equalizing 
(DPE) portion of the funding formula. Under the new law, all school districts were to 
have a flat general levy at a tax rate of 0.3241%. The state would then pay the difference 
between the amount collected from the local levy and the general education allowance. 
Under this law, the state would finance the entire cost of replacing the general education 
levy.  
 Supplemental revenue was also eliminated under the new law; although, it could 
be converted to referendum revenue by board action. A $415 referendum transfer was 
added to the basic formula and the first $415 of per pupil referendum revenue was 
eliminated. Districts with less than a $415 per pupil referendum received funding equal to 
the difference between their new revenue from the referendum levy and the $415 roll-in 
amount.  
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 The goal of the roll-in was to reduce the local share of public school funding and 
transfer it to the state. The change increased the state formula foundation payment from 
$4,068 in FY 2002 to $4,601 in FY 2003 with an increase of 13.1% (Thorson & 
Anderson, 2008). This increase; however, did not benefit local school districts as they 
merely received a tax break from their local referendum levies, not additional funding. 
Between the $415 roll-in and the elimination of the general education levy, the state had a 
40% increase in their educational share, an increase of $4.33 billion in FY 2002 to $6.09 
billion in 2003. Again, this increase benefited taxpayers, not local school districts.  
 The formula allowance that was increased to $4,061 because of the roll-in was 
immediately frozen at that level for the next few years as the state dealt with the 
country’s economic recession. The foundation level increased from $4,061 in FY 2005 to 
$5,124 in FY 2009. The level remained at the figure; however, until FY 2012 when it 
rose to $5,173 (Crowe, 2011).  
 The legislature modified the original equalization levy structure as well. After the 
initial roll-in, the state equalized referendum levies at the $126 level. Within two years, 
that amount was raised to $405 and by FY 2009, it was set at $700 (Thorson & Anderson, 
2008). This modification gave local school districts a greater incentive to pass 
referendums and to increase the percent of education revenue from property taxpayers. 
For FY 2012, the breakdown of revenue for education purposes was 77.2% from the state 
and 22.8% from property taxes (Crowe, 2011). 
Almost immediately following the 2001 changes to the Minnesota finance 
structure, the state changed the percentage of annual state aid payments during the fiscal 
year from a 90-10% shift to an 83-17% shift beginning FY 2003. This schedule meant 
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that a local district would receive 83% of their state payment that fiscal school year and 
17% the following year. That shift has increased to a 60-40% shift for FY 2012. This 
holding back of 40% of the revenue school districts need to cover operational costs has 
forced many school districts to borrow money to meet their regular yearly expenditures. 
 The 2011-12 financing of k-12 public schools in Minnesota occurred through a 
combination of state collected and locally collected property taxes. Revenue is received 
in three major categories as described in the Financing Education in Minnesota 2011-12 
report: 
1. State Education Finance Appropriations 
a. General Education Aid: The largest share of state appropriations, 
intended to provide the basic (adequate) support for the education 
program. 
b. Categorical Aid: Generally used to meet costs that vary significantly 
between districts (i.e., special education) or promote certain types of 
programs (i.e., career and technical aid, adult basic education aid, etc.) 
2. State Paid Property Taxes: Property tax credits reduce the amount of property 
taxes paid. To make up for this reduction, the state pays the difference 
between what was levied in property taxes and what is actually received by 
school districts and other taxing districts (district power equalization or DPE). 
3. Property Tax Levies: Made with voter approval or at the discretion of the 
local school board. The largest share of property tax levies made by school 
districts is from voter-approved levies: the excess operating referendum and 
debt services levies. 
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The percentage of revenue from state and local sources for FY 2012 is 77.2% from the 
state and 22.8% from local property taxes (Crowe, 2011). A more detailed description of 
the various general education revenue sources can be found in Chapter III. 
Past Minnesota Fiscal Equity Research Studies 
The following individuals researched Minnesota’s funding of K-12 education: 
Gayden F Carruth (1980), Thomas Francis Wilson (1984), Thomas Philip Jacobson 
(1986), and Gregory Vandal (1997). The ensuing section is a brief review of each study’s 
methodology and findings as well as a comparison of their individual recommendations. 
Carruth (1980) 
Carruth (1980) conducted the first study which analyzed the projected effects of 
changes in Minnesota’s funding program as of 1979 and was based upon fiscal equity. 
Eight revenue sources were examined: basic maintenance levy, discretionary levy, excess 
maintenance levy, minimum aid, referendum levy, replacement allowance, sparsity aid, 
and taconite reserve account. The researcher had five research questions along with a 
corresponding null-hypothesis for each that were proven or unproven based on the 
analysis of the funding formula. Carruth’s research was based upon the following: 
1. To determine projected statewide trends toward equitable distribution of 
selected maintenance revenues per pupil unit among Minnesota school 
districts for FY 1980-83. The null-hypothesis was that no trends toward 
improvement in equitable distribution would be observable.  
2. To identify the projected effect of each selected maintenance revenue upon 
equitable distribution per pupil unit among Minnesota school districts for FY 
1980-83. The null-hypothesis studied was that selected maintenance revenues 
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affect improvement in equitable distribution among Minnesota school districts 
in the following ways: all eight revenue sources that were individually studied 
would have no effect on equitable revenue distribution between FY 1980-83. 
3. To determine the projected effects of district geographic location upon 
equitable distribution of selected maintenance revenues per pupil unit among 
Minnesota school districts for FY 1980-83. The null-hypothesis stated district 
geographic location would have no effect on equitable distribution between 
FY 1980-83. 
4. To determine the projected effects of district size upon equitable distribution 
of selected maintenance revenues per pupil unit among Minnesota school 
districts for FY 1980-83. The null-hypothesis was that school district size 
would have no effect on equitable distribution between FY 1980-83. 
5. To determine projected effect of enrollment change upon equitable 
distribution of selected maintenance revenues per pupil unit among Minnesota 
school districts for FY 1980-83. The final null-hypothesis was that enrollment 
change would have no effect of equitable distribution between FY 1980-83 
(p.128). 
 Through the analysis of the eight revenue sources Carruth (1980) found that in 
regard to the first null-hypothesis, the statistical measures indicated that all revenue 
sources showed a decrease in perfect equity. The null-hypothesis was therefore not 
rejected, but proven. The researcher concluded that for FY 1980-83 there was not an 
observable trend toward improvement in equitable distribution. In addition, there 
appeared to be no reduction in overall disparity of the total selected maintenance 
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revenues. The revenue availability for the total selected maintenance revenues appeared 
to be moving progressively toward less fiscal neutrality by 1983 and no apparent progress 
toward leveling up to the median revenue occurred during the years studied. 
 Carruth’s (1980) second finding showed mixed results. Regarding the analysis of 
the basic maintenance revenue source, the findings rejected the null-hypothesis for FY 
1980 and 1981. The null-hypothesis was not rejected; however, for FY 1982 and 1983. In 
regards to the discretionary revenue, the findings rejected the null-hypothesis; although, 
there was improvement found in equity distribution for FY 1981 and 1982. Carruth’s 
analysis determined the least equitable revenue source was basic maintenance and 
minimum aid. The revenue with the greatest variance was the excess maintenance. The 
study found taconite revenue to be the least equalizing revenue and the revenue source 
least fiscally neutral was the referendum revenue based on local property taxes.  
 The third, fourth, and fifth null-hypotheses in regard to district geographic 
location, school district size, and enrollment changes were rejected for all revenue 
sources. The findings suggested that geographic location and district size did appear to 
have an effect on the equitable revenue distribution. In regard to enrollment changes, 
there appeared to be a reduction in overall revenue disparity among districts that 
experienced an enrollment growth. By FY 1983, declining enrollment districts appeared 
to be less fiscally neutral than districts that had seen growth in enrollment.  
Wilson (1984) 
The next fiscal equity study conducted on the Minnesota funding formula was 
completed in 1984 by Thomas Francis Wilson. The purpose of this study was to develop 
an alternative model for reforming the Minnesota School Foundation Program for 
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funding public elementary and secondary schools. The model was based on total 
foundation revenues for FY 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82. The revenue sources that 
were analyzed were the same as in the Carruth (1980) study. Wilson (1984) proposed the 
following research objectives: 
1. Develop an alternative model for reforming the Minnesota School Foundation 
Program for funding public elementary and secondary schools. 
2. Analyze the actual program, the alternative program, and each of two 
alternative model modifications to test for the equitable distribution of 
revenues provided by each.  
3. Compare the actual program to the alternative model and Carruth’s findings as 
well as compare the alternative model to each of its modifications to 
determine which offered the greater fiscal equity and wealth neutrality for 
financing Minnesota’s public schools (p.114). 
The following null-hypotheses were tested in regard to the actual foundation program and 
the alternative model. Also listed are the findings for each null-hypothesis.  
1. There will be no observable differences in fiscal disparity between the Carruth 
(1980) predictions and the actual foundation revenues for FY 1980-82. The 
findings rejected this null-hypothesis, as the actual foundation revenue was 
more disparate than Carruth’s predictions.  
2. There will be no observable differences in wealth neutrality between the 
Carruth (1980) predictions and the actual foundation revenues for FY 1980-
82. Null-Hypothesis 2 was also rejected, as there was more dependency on 
local wealth than predicted by Carruth. 
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3. Trends toward the reduction of fiscal disparity in the various actual foundation 
revenues will not be observable for the FY 1980-82. The findings showed a 
decline in fiscal disparity, so the null-hypothesis was not rejected.  
4. Trends toward a more neutral wealth distribution of revenues for actual 
foundation revenues will not be observable for FY 1980 through 1982. The 
findings showed a decline between 1980 and 1982 in regard to wealth 
neutrality; therefore, the null-hypothesis was not rejected. 
5. Trends toward the reduction of fiscal disparity in the alternative foundation 
revenue will not be observable for FY 1980 through 1982. Null-Hypothesis 5 
was rejected as the findings either showed perfect equity or a steady progress 
toward improved equity.  
6. Trends toward a more wealth neutral distribution of revenue for the alternative 
foundation revenues will not be observable for FY 1980 through 1982. The 
findings indicated an improvement in the wealth neutrality of each revenue 
source. The null-hypothesis was therefore rejected.  
7. There will be no observable differences in fiscal disparity between the actual 
foundation revenue model and the alternative foundation revenue model for 
FY 1980 through 1982. Null-Hypothesis 7 was rejected as there was a 
reduction in fiscal disparity in the alternative method Wilson analyzed. 
8. There will be no observable differences in wealth neutrality between the 
actual foundation model and the alternative foundation model for FY 1980 
through 1982. The findings showed that the Gini Coefficient was lower in the 
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alternative model and that it was decreasing over the years analyzed. The null-
hypothesis was rejected. 
9. There will be no observable differences in fiscal disparity between the 
alternative foundation model and modifications IA and IB of the alternative 
model for FY 1982. Null-hypothesis nine was rejected.  
10. There will be no observable differences in wealth neutrality between the 
alternative foundation revenue model and modifications IA and IB in FY 
1982. Null-hypothesis ten was also rejected.  
 Based upon the statistical analysis, Wilson determined that the actual foundation 
revenue was more disparate in equity and less wealth neutral than the predictions given in 
the Carruth (1980) study. Overall, there was deterioration in fiscal equity for FY 1980 
through 1982. In addition, the alternative foundation model showed less wealth 
dependence and appeared to be more equitable in the disbursements of the revenue 
sources analyzed than the actual foundation program.  
Jacobson (1986) 
The purpose of the third equity study was to assess the 1983-84 foundation 
formula versus the 1984-85 five-tier discretionary formula with regard to fiscal equity 
and wealth neutrality. The five-tier plan replaced the grandfather, replacement, 
discretionary, and low fund balance components of the foundation aid program. The 
tiered program contained a basic foundation aid component, a cost differential 
component, and three tiers of equalized levy authority. Jacobson (1986) proposed the 
following research questions and null-hypothesis: 
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1. Were there fiscal equity and wealth neutrality differences between the 1983-
84 foundation formula and the 1984-85 five-tier discretionary formula?  His 
expected outcome was that on a statewide basis, there would be no observable 
effect upon fiscal equity or wealth neutrality between the 1983-84 foundation 
formula and the 1984-85 five-tier discretionary formula. 
2. What effect does the training and experience factor have on fiscal equity and 
wealth neutrality in the five-tier discretionary formula?  Null-Hypothesis 2 
again stated that the research would show no observable effect upon fiscal 
equity or wealth neutrality as a result of the training and experience index. 
3. What is the effect of the sparsity factor on fiscal equity and wealth neutrality 
in the five-tier discretionary formula?  Null-Hypothesis 3 was that on a 
statewide basis, no observable effect upon fiscal equity or wealth neutrality 
would be found in regards to the sparsity factor. 
4. Is there a relationship between geographic location and fiscal disparities?  The 
4th null-hypothesis was that there would be no observable relationship 
between geographic location and fiscal disparities. 
5. Is there any relationship between the size of the school district in terms of 
enrollment and fiscal disparity?  The last null-hypothesis was that there would 
be no observable effect between school district size in terms of enrollment and 
fiscal disparities (p.64). 
 Through the research and analysis of the foundation programs, all null-hypothesis 
were rejected; however, there appeared to be improvements in regard to geographic 
location and school district enrollment. Based on the study, Jacobson (1986) concluded 
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that on a statewide basis, the five-tier discretionary improved the fiscal equity as well as 
the wealth neutrality. The training and experience index did not improve either fiscal 
equity or wealth neutrality. The sparsity index also did not improve fiscal equity or 
wealth neutrality and was the most disparate component of the foundation program. 
Overall, there seemed to be a “leveling up” for all district size ranges in the study.  
Vandal (1997) 
Vandal (1997) conducted the fourth and final equity study. The purpose of the 
study was to assess the 1993-94 general education (funding) formula with regard to fiscal 
equity and wealth neutrality. The selected revenue sources analyzed were: basic revenue, 
compensatory education revenue, sparsity revenue, training and experience revenue, 
supplemental revenue, referendum revenue, and total general education program revenue. 
There were four research questions: 
1. What were the fiscal equity and wealth neutrality characteristics of 
Minnesota’s school districts based on an analysis of the 1983-84 general 
education formula? 
2. What trends can be observed for Minnesota’s school districts from an 
examination of like data elements from the four major studies of fiscal equity 
and wealth neutrality in Minnesota? 
3. What trends can be observed for regions of the state from an examination of 
like data elements from the four major studies of fiscal equity and wealth 
neutrality in Minnesota? 
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4. What trends can be observed for school districts of similar size from an 
examination of like data elements from the four major studies of fiscal equity 
and wealth neutrality in Minnesota (Vandal, 1997, p.4)? 
 Based on his research, Vandal (1997) had 16 null-hypothesis. They are listed 
below along with the corresponding findings:   
1. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the training and experience 
(T & E) allowance will not be observable. This null-hypothesis was rejected 
as the T & E allowance was observed to be distributed equitably. 
2. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the sparsity allowance will 
not be observable. This null-hypothesis was not rejected as the allowance was 
lacking in wealth neutrality.  
3. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the compensatory allowance 
will not be observable.  The null-hypothesis not rejected. 
4. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the supplemental allowance 
will not be observable. The null-hypothesis was not rejected.  
5. On a statewide basis in 1994, there will be no observable effect on equitable 
revenue distribution per pupil unit of the excess levy referendum. Again, this 
null-hypothesis was not rejected due to the fact that the excess levy was 
dependent on local voter approval. 
6. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the combined general 
education program categories of the general education formula will not be 
observable for 1994. This null-hypothesis was rejected as the overall general 
formula was progressing to equitable distribution.  
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7. On a statewide basis, there will be no observable relationship between 
geographic local fiscal disparities, using the ECSU regions. The null-
hypothesis was rejected. 
8. On a statewide basis, there will be no observable effect between school 
district size in terms of enrollment and fiscal disparities. The null-hypothesis 
was rejected. 
9. On a statewide basis, trends toward improvement in the equitable distribution 
of the training and experience allowance will not be observable between the 
Jacobson (1986) study and the current study. The findings showed that there 
was a trend toward more equity; therefore, the null-hypothesis was rejected. 
10. On a statewide basis, trends toward improvement in the equitable distribution 
of the sparsity allowance will not be observable between the Carruth (1980) 
study and the current study. The findings in regard to sparsity showed that the 
trend was progressing away from equity and the null-hypothesis was not 
rejected. 
11. On a statewide basis, trends toward improvement in the equitable distribution 
of the compensatory allowance will not be observable between the Wilson 
(1984) study and the current study. The null-hypothesis was not rejected. 
12. On a statewide basis, trends toward improvement in equitable distribution of 
the supplemental allowance will not be observable between the Wilson (1984) 
study and the current study. The null-hypothesis was not rejected. 
13. On a statewide basis, there will be no observable effect on the equitable 
revenue distribution per pupil unit of the excess levy referendum between the 
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Carruth (1980) study and the current study. The findings showed that since the 
Carruth study there was a trend toward greater equity; therefore, the null-
hypothesis was rejected. 
14. On a statewide basis, trends toward improvement in the equitable distribution 
of the total general education program categories presented in each study will 
not be observable between the Carruth (1980) study and the current study. 
There was an improvement in equity between the Carruth to the Jacobson 
(1986) study; however, there was lesser equity between the current study and 
the Carruth study. The null-hypothesis was not rejected. 
15. On a statewide basis, there will be no observable relationship between 
geographic location and fiscal disparities between the Carruth (1980) study 
and the current study. The null-hypothesis was rejected. 
16. On a statewide basis, there will be no observable effect between school 
district sizes as measured by enrollment criteria between the Carruth (1980) 
and the current study. The findings showed the fiscal disparities were 
comparable from the Carruth to the Vandal (1997) study and the null-
hypothesis rejected.  
 Based on the findings of the research, Vandal (1997) came a variety of 
conclusions. First, the implementation of the training and experience allowance marked 
an improvement in equity from the Jacobson (1986) study through 1994. The sparsity 
index became less equitable over time; however, the results were discounted as it was 
only given to a small number of school districts.  The compensatory allowance could also 
be discounted based on the same criteria of the sparsity allowance. The supplemental 
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allowance was not an equalizer in the Minnesota funding formula. The same was true of 
the excess levy because of the restrictions placed upon it. Declining enrollment did not 
appear to adversely impact the results of the cross-study analysis. Finally, significant 
disparities existed across the regions of the state and the conditions had gotten worse over 
the course of the studies. 
 Table 1 created by Larson, illustrates the recommendations of the past four fiscal 
equity studies. 
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Adequacy 
A common concept among all recommendations was adequacy and the execution 
of a future study based upon an adequate funding structure. There have been two 
different adequacy cost-out studies conducted in the past 10 years. A cost-out study is 
described as “a study that determines the amount of money actually needed to make 
available all of the educational services required to provide every child an opportunity to 
meet the applicable state education standards” (National Access Network, 2006, para.1). 
There are three primary adequacy methodologies: professional judgment, expert 
judgment (evidence-based), and successful school districts. 
 According to the National Access Network (2006), the professional judgment 
approach is defined as taking teams of professionals (teachers, administrators, school 
officials, etc.) and asking them to define an educational program that would meet stated 
proficiency goals and to identify the specific resources that would be necessary for its 
success. The expert judgment or evidence-based approach is similar in nature to 
professional judgment; however, in the expert judgment approach, the teams are replaced 
with educational policy experts. This approach takes current research and creates the 
programs that are needed to meet the standards. Finally, the successful school districts 
approach identifies those school districts that are currently meeting state standards and 
uses their average expenditures as a fair estimate of the actual cost of an adequate 
education.  
Of the three approaches, none have been used consistently more frequently than 
the others. The biggest issue with the various approaches is that findings can vary 
significantly from one approach to another. In a study conducted by Taylor (2005), the 
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successful schools approach had a per pupil range of $5,124 while the professional 
judgment approach resulted in $7,504 per pupil, a difference of 46%. Taylor’s study 
illustrates the difficulty that can arise in trying to reconcile varying results from two 
different approaches.   
The first cost-out study for the State of Minnesota was completed in 2004 when 
Governor Pawlenty created a 19-member task force to examine the state’s funding 
formula and recommend possible improvements.  The task force hired consultants from 
Management Analysis and Planning, Inc (MAP). The professional judgment approach 
was chosen as the medium of analysis. MAP brought together three panels over a three-
day period to determine an adequate funding level for schools. Each team created their 
ideal school and expenditures that would be needed to meet the state’s educational 
standards. Despite the fact that each panel used the same approach, they came up with 
varying results in regards to per pupil payments: $7,941.84, $8,335.35, and $9,150.84 
(Management Analysis and Planning, Inc., 2004). 
The task force took the recommendations and findings presented in the study and 
submitted their report to the Governor. Investing in our Future (2004 Task Force, 2004) 
detailed a six-point plan for a 21st century school funding system: 
1. Minnesota’s 21st century educational funding formula should be a rationally 
determined, learning-linked, student-orientated, and cost-based instructional 
services allocation. 
2. Minnesota’s education must be enhanced even further by linking education 
funding to school and student performance. 
64 
3. A district’s instructional services allocation, regardless of revenue source, 
should be considered by the state as a local discretion, appropriately regulated, 
block grant. 
4. School districts should continue to have state equalized revenue-raising 
authority to support locally preferred education activities, services, and 
innovations through voter-approved referendums. 
5. Minnesota should promote innovation in education as a means of maximizing 
financial resources to school districts.  
6. Minnesota education funding should be conceived as a five-tier system:  
instructional services, local district revenues, innovative programs, categorical 
programs, and facilities and debt service (2004 Task Force, 2004, para.2). 
Ultimately, no follow up occurred in regard to the study’s recommendations. 
Mary Cecconi, State Director for the Parents United Network urged the 2005 Legislative 
Session to continue studying the report, but the study remained unutilized (Cecconi, 
2004). 
 The next adequacy study was completed in 2006 by Augenblick, Palaich, and 
Associates, Inc. (Silverstein, Rose, & Myers, 2006) at the request of P.S. Minnesota, a 
coalition of statewide education organizations, parents, and public school supporters 
dedicated to meeting the academic challenges facing today’s students. The coalition 
operates on three beliefs: 
1. It’s time to fund public schools in a way that honors Minnesota’s 
constitutional commitment to educate all students. 
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2. It’s time to fund public schools in a way that allows districts to meet state and 
federal standards as well as community expectations. 
3. It’s time to fund public schools in a way that rationally accounts for the real 
costs of meeting the needs of individual students and individual districts (P.S. 
Minnesota, 2013, para.4). 
Silverstein et al. (2006) used both the professional judgment approach and the 
successful schools approach. Using the first approach, the researchers concluded that a 
per pupil payment of $5,938 was needed to meet state standards. Using the latter 
approach, a per pupil payment of $5,359 was calculated (Silverstein et al., 2006). For 
comparison purposes, the actual per pupil payment in 2004-05 was $4,601 per pupil. 
Implementing the study’s recommendations would have been an increase in state funding 
of $1.79 billion and $1.05 billion respectfully (Samberg, 2007). One perceived flaw with 
this study is that it did not take into account the local operating revenues, which were 
additional funds outside of the state funding system. 
The issue of equitable school funding has been debated for well over a century. 
Some modifications to the funding formula have resulted in increased equity, while some 
have not. Several studies have been completed on the matter, including four dissertation 
studies. The last study; however, was completed over 15 years ago. Several adjustments 
to Minnesota’s funding formula have taken place since Vandal’s study in 1997. This 
study incorporates these funding changes and will therefore be a clearer picture of the 
current state of public school funding in Minnesota. The exact research design is 
thoroughly discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter III 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of policy change on fiscal 
equity and wealth neutrality in Minnesota between fiscal year 2003 and 2012. The study 
was based on three research questions: 
1. Based on an analysis of the trend data from fiscal years 2003 to 2012 general 
education formula, what were the fiscal equality and wealth neutrality 
characteristics of Minnesota’s school districts? 
2. Based on an examination of like data elements from the four major Minnesota 
fiscal equality and wealth neutrality studies, what trends can be observed? 
3. Based on the recommendations of previous studies, what legislative impact 
did they have? 
 The purpose of this chapter is to detail the research design that was used to 
analyze the fiscal equity and wealth neutrality of the Minnesota Public School funding 
formula. This chapter identifies both the population of study and the data included in the 
analysis. In addition, the conceptual framework for evaluating the equity of the formula is 
explained, as well the fiscal equity measures and the wealth neutrality measures. Finally, 
the research hypothesis is likewise explained. 
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The Population 
 The survey population for this study included 333 Public Operating Elementary 
and Secondary Independent Districts (type 1 classification) as derived from the 
Minnesota Department of Education (Minnesota Department of Education, 2012). Three 
public school districts were not included: Prinsburg and Franconia were eliminated as the 
school districts are Non-Operating Common School Districts (type 2 classification) and 
Pine Point was eliminated as it has no recorded property wealth. This was consistent with 
prior dissertation studies. The number of districts in the Vandal (1997) study totaled 392; 
however, this number is not consistent with the current study as there have been 
consolidations in k-12 public school districts across the state since that time.    
The Data 
 The statistical measures used in this study were consistent with that of Vandal 
(1997) for comparison purposes. Two data sources were utilized: demographic data and 
revenue data. The demographic data consisted of the name of each school district, the 
school district number, and the weighted average daily membership (WADM) for the 
2011-12 school year. All demographic data was obtained from the Minnesota Department 
of Education (MDE) website. The revenue data includes basic general education revenue 
per (WADM), basic skills revenue, referendum revenue, and total general revenue. All 
revenue sources were gathered from 2003-2012 data listed on the MDA website. 
 The focus of this study was fiscal equality and wealth neutrality. In order to 
remain consistent with previous studies, the revenue data was encoded using a common 
statistical treatment (Vandal, 1997). For data analysis purposes, the scheme R(X,Y) is 
used where X denotes the revenue source, so that: 
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Table 2.  R(X) Data Analysis Scheme 
1 General basic revenue per WADM 
2-3 Basic skills:  compensatory and limited English proficiency (LEP) 
revenue 
 
4 Training and experience revenue 
5 Sparsity revenue 
6 Equity revenue 
7 Transition revenue 
8 Referendum revenue 
9 Total general education revenue 
 
And Y denotes the fiscal year of the data used in the analysis, so that: 
 0 = the fiscal year ending June 30, 2003 
The coding system produced the following variables: 
Variable Code Variable Name 
 
R(1,0) 2002-03 general basic revenue per WADM 
R(2,0) 2002-03 compensatory revenue 
R(3,0) 2002-03 LEP revenue 
R(4,0) 2002-03 training and experience revenue 
R(5,0) 2002-03 sparsity revenue 
R(6,0) 2002-03 equity revenue 
R(7,0) 2002-03 transition revenue 
R(8,0) 2002-03 referendum revenue 
R(9,0) 2002-03 total general education revenue 
 
Research Methodology 
There have been four previous equity studies conducted on the Minnesota funding 
formula: Carruth (1980), Wilson (1984), Jacobson (1986), and Vandal (1997). To 
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maintain consistency and provide longitudinal data, this research parallels those studies in 
research design. 
 This study used the recommendations of Berne & Stiefel (1984) for the basis of 
the statistical devices used to analyze the Minnesota funding formula. Berna & Stiefel 
(1984) established the rationale for the use of the variance, permissible variance, 
coefficient of variation, and Gini Coefficient in the study of school equity.  
 The dependent variable for the research was fiscal equality. True fiscal equality 
requires that equal revenues be available for each specific source of revenue and that 
these revenues not be a function of the school district wealth, but rather a function of the 
wealth of the state as a whole (wealth neutrality).  
Fiscal Equity Measures 
Three different measures of fiscal equity were used to analyze the equity of the 
Minnesota funding formula. The statistical tools used were the variance, permissible 
variance, and coefficient of variation.  The statistical measures were consistent with the 
Vandal (1997) study. The measures are described as follows: 
Variance:  The variance is the average of the squared deviations of each per-pupil 
object from the mean per-pupil object; the smaller the variance, the smaller the variation 
in the distribution of a given variable (revenue). The variance was used to analyze the 
degree to which there is dispersion around the mean; the smaller the variance, the greater 
the equity of the particular variable (revenue). The formula for computing the variance 
was as follows: 
 /  
 Where Pi =  the number of pupils in district i 
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  N  =  the number of districts 
  Xi  =  the average revenues per pupil in district i 
  Xp  =  the mean revenues per pupil for all pupils 
 Permissible Variance: The permissible variance is the ratio of the actual sum of 
per-pupil objects for pupils below the median to the sum of the per-pupil objects that 
would exist if each pupil below the median were at the median per-pupil object. In other 
words, “permissible variance shows to what extent the funding formula succeed in 
‘leveling up’ the bottom half to the middle (Baker, 2013, p.9). The permissible variance 
is also known as the McLoone index and is computed as follows: 
  /Mp  where districts i through J are below Mp 
 Where Pi  =  the number of pupils in district i 
  N  =  the number of districts 
  Xi  =  the average revenues per pupil in district i 
  Mp =  the median revenues per pupil for all pupils 
 
The permissible variance is expressed as a decimal with a value between zero and one. 
The closer the decimal approaches one, the closer the object is to equity. The number can 
also be used to determine the revenue needed to bring the weighted pupil units up to the 
median level. 
 Coefficient of Variation: The coefficient of variation is the square root of the 
variance of per-pupil objects divided by the mean per-pupil objects. The coefficient of 
variation is typically between zero and one. Similar to the variance, a smaller coefficient 
of variation indicates a smaller distribution between the objects, thus showing greater 
equity. The coefficient of variation is used to show the overall disparity in revenues 
across school districts and is computed as follows: 
    / Xp 
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 Where VAR = variance and Xp = the mean revenues per pupil for all pupils 
Wealth Neutrality Measures 
The measure of wealth neutrality that was used is the Gini Coefficient, also 
known as the Gini Index. This tool examines the dispersion of two different variables.  In 
this case the distribution of per pupil revenues and the wealth measure of per pupil 
property valuations. The process begins by ranking all school districts from the lowest to 
the highest based on the per pupil property wealth. This value is shown by the adjusted 
net tax capacity (ANTC). 
 Once the districts have been ranked, the Gini Coefficient involves the calculation 
of a cumulative percentage distribution of per pupil funding, which again ranks from the 
poorest to the richest districts. Results are shown as values from zero to one with a value 
of one showing absolute equity. The Gini Coefficient is calculated with the formula: 
  /  (2( 2Xp) 
 Where Pi  =  the number of pupils in district i 
  N  =  the number of districts 
  Xi  =  the average revenues per pupil in district i 
  Xp  =  the mean revenues per pupil for all pupils 
 
Figure 2, originally created by Carruth (1980) represents a visual road map of 
both the fiscal equity and wealth neutrality measures (Vandal, 1997).  The figure shows 
the importance of how the statistical measures findings can be directly traced back to 
social issue that have been used in regard to fiscal equity in legal cases against state’s 
funding of k-12 public education.   
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    Figure 2. Framework for Equity Evaluation. 
Research Hypotheses and Procedures 
For a comparative analysis with previous equity studies, several null hypotheses 
were tested: 
1. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution on the basic general formula 
revenue will be observed during 2003 to 2012 showing fiscal equity. 
2. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the basic skills 
(compensatory and LEP) revenue will not be observed during 2003 to 2012. 
3. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the training and experience 
revenue will not be observed during 2003 to 2012. 
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4. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the sparsity revenue will not 
be observed during 2003 to 2012. 
5. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the equity revenue will not 
be observed during 2003 to 2012. 
6. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the transition revenue will 
not be observed during 2003 to 2012. 
7. On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution on the referendum revenue will 
not be observed during 2003 to 2012. 
8. On a statewide basis, the wealth neutrality of the total general revenue 
distribution will not be observable in 2003 to 2012. 
Summary 
 The research will be conducted with statistical measures based on fiscal equity 
and wealth neutrality.  Only the public schools that were identified through the 
Minnesota Department of Education, as type 1 schools will be analyzed based on 
the hypothesis explained above.  The research conducted on the fiscal years from 
2003 to 2012 will detail the current inequity of the 2011-2012 funding formula.  
Chapter four will provide the findings of the research, followed by 
recommendations from the researcher in chapter five. 
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Chapter IV 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of policy change on fiscal 
equity and wealth neutrality in Minnesota between fiscal year 2003 and 2012. The survey 
population includes 333 Public Operating Elementary and Secondary Independent 
Districts (type 1 classification) as derived from the Minnesota Department of Education 
(Minnesota Department of Education, 2012). The measures of fiscal equity and wealth 
neutrality were the same used by Vandal in 1997. This study was based on three research 
questions: 
1. Based on an analysis of the 2003 to 2012 general education formula, what 
were the fiscal equality and wealth neutrality characteristics of Minnesota’s 
school districts? 
2. Based on an examination of like data elements from the four major Minnesota 
fiscal equality and wealth neutrality studies, what trends can be observed? 
3. Based on the recommendations of previous studies, what legislative impact 
did they have? 
Three different measures of fiscal equity were used to analyze the equity of the 
Minnesota funding formula: variance, permissible variance, and coefficient of variation. 
The measures are described as follows: 
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Variance: The average of the squared deviation of each per-pupil object from the 
mean per-pupil object; the smaller the variance, the smaller the variation in the 
distribution of a given variable (revenue). The variance is used to analyze the degree to 
which there is dispersion around the mean; the smaller the variance, the greater the equity 
of the particular variable (revenue).  
Permissible Variance (McLoone Index): The ratio of the actual sum of per-pupil 
objects for pupils below the median to the sum of the per-pupil objects that would exist if 
each pupil below the median were at the median per-pupil object. The closer the decimal 
approaches one, the closer the object is to equity. The number can also be used to 
determine the revenue needed to bring the weighted pupil units up to the medial level. 
Coefficient of Variation: The square root of the variance of per-pupil objects 
divided by the mean per-pupil objects. The coefficient of variation is typically between 
zero and one. As with the variance, the smaller the coefficient of variation, the smaller 
distribution between objects showing greater equity. This tool is used to show the overall 
disparities in revenues across school districts. The sections below detail the researcher’s 
findings in regards to Null-Hypotheses 1 through 7. 
Null-Hypothesis Results 
Null-Hypothesis 1: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the basic 
general formula revenue will be observed between 2003 and 2012 showing fiscal equity. 
Results: Table 3 represents the statistical findings in regard to Null-Hypothesis 1: 
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Table 3.  Fiscal Equity Analysis of the Basic General Revenue. 
 
 The basic general revenue establishes the minimum level of funding for school 
districts. It is the most equitable revenue sources as it approaches perfect equity in regard 
to both the permissible variance and the coefficient of variation. This result is expected as 
the basic general revenue is a flat foundation payment given to all school districts based 
on their WADM. For the 2011-12 school year, the foundation payment was 
$5,224/WADM.  
Based on the results above, an equitable distribution was observed; therefore, 
Null-Hypothesis 1 was accepted. 
Null-Hypothesis 2: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the basic 
skills (compensatory and LEP) revenue will not be observed between 2003 and 2012. 
The basic skills revenue in the Minnesota funding formula is broken into two sub-
categories: compensatory and LEP. Compensatory revenue is disbursed based on a school 
district’s number of students that are eligible for free or reduced lunches. LEP revenue is 
Basic/ADM  
Variance 
Basic Permissible 
Variance 
Basic Coefficient of 
Variation 
R(1,0) 8640.350 0.9932 0.0172 
R(1,1) 4077.685 0.9930 0.0118 
R(1,2) 3535.559 0.9949 0.0110 
R(1,3) 4249.709 0.9925 0.0116 
R(1,4) 3694.800 0.9925 0.0104 
R(1,6) 3726.501 0.9915 0.0102 
R(1,7) 4247.780 0.9921 0.0109 
R(1,8) 3842.041 0.9918 0.0104 
R(1,9) 4446.438 0.9907 0.0111 
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based on a school district’s limited English proficiency students. Districts can receive 
LEP funding for the first five years a particular LEP student is enrolled. All school 
districts receive some basic skills revenue. 
Results: Table 4 represents the compensatory statistical findings. 
Table 4. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the Compensatory Revenue. 
 
 
Compensatory 
Variance 
Compensatory 
Permissible 
Variance 
Compensatory 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
R(2,0) 196443.453 0.4016 1.5389 
R(2,1) 161382.703 0.3805 1.4448 
R(2,2) 169621.721 0.3943 1.3547 
R(2,3) 186812.741 0.4184 1.2749 
R(2,4) 202815.660 0.4493 1.2757 
R(2,5) 201247.749 0.4403 1.1836 
R(2,6) 201885.923 0.4542 1.1403 
R(2,7) 191150.820 0.4671 1.0902 
R(2,8) 218278.841 0.4921 0.9961 
R(2,9) 211753.560 0.4997 0.9277 
 The statistical findings for Null-Hypothesis 2 show that the compensatory revenue 
is not equitable. In order to reach perfect equity, the permissible variance should 
approach 1.0. The compensatory revenue was below 0.5 consistently over the 10-year 
period. The coefficient of variation also indicated an inequitable distribution of funds. 
The permissible variance; however, was improving over that timeline as was the 
coefficient of variation.  Permissible variation achieves perfect equity as it approaches 
1.0.  The findings from the analysis of compensatory revenue show a gradual increase, 
but a distance away from approaching true equity. 
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Based on the statistical results in terms of the inequitable distribution of funds, 
Null-Hypothesis 2 was accepted.  
 The second sub-category of basic skills is the LEP revenue source. Table 5 
represents the research findings for this sub-category. 
Table 5. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the LEP Revenue. 
 
LEP  
Variance 
LEP Permissible 
Variance 
LEP Coefficient of 
Variation 
R(3,0) 7154.679 0.4777 3.3834 
R(3,1) 3363.206 0.4614 2.6360 
R(3,2) 3301.323 0.4877 2.2982 
R(3,3) 3384.655 0.4586 2.4240 
R(3,4) 3481.739 0.4758 2.5654 
R(3,5) 3466.783 0.4857 2.4533 
R(3,6) 3465.008 0.4555 2.6756 
R(3,7) 3200.011 0.4499 2.5713 
R(3,8) 3000.673 0.4600 2.3816 
R(3,9) 3192.916 0.4654 2.3544 
 
 The findings for LEP were similar in nature to the compensatory revenue. The 
permissible variance varied between a high of 0.4877 in 2005 to a low of 0.4555 in 2009. 
It failed to rise above the 0.5 level, leading to a finding of inequitable distribution on a 
statewide scale. As previously indicated, in order to reach perfect equity, the permissible 
variance should approach 1.0.  The coefficient of variation had a range of 3.3834 in 2003 
to 2.2982 in 2005. These values show a wide variance in revenue disbursement statewide.  
LEP revenue is disbursed to school districts based on the number of students with limited 
English proficiency.     
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Once again, these statistical findings lead to an inequitable disbursement of 
funding; therefore, Null-Hypothesis 2 was again accepted. 
Null-Hypothesis 3: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the training 
and experience revenue will not be observed between 2003 and 2012. 
 Training and experience revenue (T & E) was the third revenue source analyzed. 
T & E was disbursed to school districts based on the experience and education of 
individual faculty members. The T & E revenue was repealed and data is not available for 
the 2011-12 school year. This will be statistically represented with “NA” in Table 6. 
Results: Table 6 represents the findings in regard to training and experience 
revenue. 
Table 6. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the T & E Revenue. 
 
T & E  
Variance 
T & E Permissible 
Variance 
T & E Coefficient 
of Variation 
R(4,0) 791.857 0.2235 0.9379 
R(4,1) 695.123 0.2445 1.0546 
R(4,2) 538.137 0.1050 1.2209 
R(4,3) 358.951 - 1.3532 
R(4,4) 207.566 - 1.6007 
R(4,5) 95.834 - 1.9579 
R(4,6) 54.045 - 2.4505 
R(4,7) 25.882 - 2.5437 
R(4,8) 14.661 - 3.8290 
R(4,9)                          
- = could not be collected due to median = 0 
 Because not all school districts received T & E funding between fiscal years 2006 
and 2011, the permissible variance could not be computed as the median level equaled 
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revenue of 0. For fiscal years 2003 to 2005, the permissible variance results displayed an 
inequitable distribution in terms of T & E revenue. The coefficient of variation results 
also displayed an inequitable distribution. From 2003 to 2011, the range of distribution 
widened until it was repealed by the state legislature in fiscal year 2012. 
Based on the statistical results detailed above, Null-Hypothesis 3 was accepted. 
Null-Hypothesis 4: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the sparsity 
revenue will not be observed between 2003 and 2012. 
 Sparsity revenue provides funding for small and isolated school districts. The 
revenue formula takes into account the school’s enrollment, distance to the nearest 
district, and geographic area. Schools with small enrollments in larger geographic 
districts tend to receive the largest portion of sparsity revenue. 
Results: Table 7 displays the fiscal equity findings in terms of sparsity revenue. 
Table 7. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the Sparsity Revenue. 
 
Sparsity  
Variance 
Sparsity 
Permissible 
Variance 
Sparsity Coefficient 
of Variation 
R(5,0) 27740.065 - 1.5421 
R(5,1) 28707.961 - 1.4862 
R(5,2) 30383.851 - 1.4647 
R(5,3) 34741.472 - 1.4228 
R(5,4) 39209.266 - 1.3944 
R(5,5) 42993.298 - 1.3731 
R(5,6) 46715.905 - 1.3424 
R(5,7) 47776.642 - 1.3327 
R(5,8) 49224.809 - 1.3285 
R(5,9) 52754.334 - 1.3050 
- = could not be collected due to median = 0 
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 Like the T & E revenue, not all school districts receive sparsity funding. In fiscal 
year 2012, only 98 school districts received sparsity revenue; a figure that represents less 
than 30% of all school districts. Because of this, the median revenue was zero between 
2003 and 2012. As a result, permissible variance could not be computed.   
 The results of the coefficient of variation ranged from a high of 1.5421 in 2003 to 
a low of 1.3050 in 2012. Perfect equity would be achieved at a coefficient of variation of 
zero. The findings detailed above show an inequitable disbursement of the sparsity 
revenue on a statewide basis. The number was decreasing each year; however, which 
indicates an improvement in overall equity.   
Based on the results described above, Null-Hypothesis 4 was accepted. 
Null-Hypothesis 5: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the equity 
revenue will not be observed between 2003 and 2012. 
 Equity revenue is intended to reduce the per pupil disparities between all school 
districts. Equity revenue has three sub-categories: regular (which all school districts 
receive), low-referendum (which is an equalizing component based on the school 
district’s excess levy referendum), and a supplemental component for districts with 
referendum amounts below 10% of the state average. In order for a school district to 
receive the low-referendum and supplemental components, the school district must have 
a voter approved excess levy referendum in their district.  This is important because if a 
school district does not have voter approval for a referendum levy, they do not qualify for 
the equity revenue regardless of what their local property tax rate may be. 
Results: Table 8 details the equity results in terms of equity revenue. 
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Table 8. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the Equity Revenue. 
 
Equity 
Variance 
Equity Permissible 
Variance 
Equity Coefficient 
of Variation 
R(6,0) 1.263 0.4613 0.0261 
R(6,1) 580.924 0.5402 0.5605 
R(6,2) 940.992 0.5591 0.5288 
R(6,3) 1234.922 0.6353 0.4880 
R(6,4) 1414.186 0.7548 0.3008 
R(6,5) 1236.045 0.7837 0.2812 
R(6,6) 1323.907 0.7542 0.2910 
R(6,7) 1375.106 0.7541 0.2990 
R(6,8) 1217.209 0.7522 0.2859 
R(6,9) 1169.080 0.7363 0.2825 
 
The statistical findings for equity revenue show an increase in fiscal equity from 
2003 to 2012. The permissible variance in 2003 was 0.4613, but that figure rose to 
0.7363 in 2012. Perfect equity occurs at a permissible variance of 1.0. Although the 
findings in this case did not represent equity, progress is indicated by the statistical 
improvement over the 10-year period.  
 The coefficient of variation also displayed an increase in equitable distribution 
over the duration of the time period. The finding of 0.0261 in 2003 could have been the 
result of the general levy-roll in that year of $415 into the basic general funding. Overall, 
the coefficient was making progress and moving toward perfect equity at 0.0. 
Because of these findings, Null-Hypothesis 5 was not accepted. 
Null-Hypothesis 6: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the transition 
revenue will not be observed between 2003 and 2012: 
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 Transition revenue was created due to funding formula modifications as the result 
of a 2003 amendment by the Minnesota legislature. The revenue ensures that districts 
receive funding that equals the amount the district would have received prior to the 
amendment. The first year school districts were eligible for transition revenue was the 
2004 fiscal year. Not all school districts receive transition revenue. In fiscal year 2012, 
two hundred school districts received the funding. 
Results: Table 9 details the equity results in regard to transition revenue analysis. 
Table 9. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the Transition Revenue. 
 
Transition  
Variance 
Transition Permissible 
Variance 
Transition Coefficient 
of Variation 
R(7,0) 
R(7,1) 5236.613 0.1602 4.0202 
R(7,2) 5169.120 0.1653 3.9942 
R(7,3) 4949.250 0.2555 3.7026 
R(7,4) 4818.811 0.1795 4.0833 
R(7,5) 4795.264 0.1851 3.8471 
R(7,6) 4675.824 0.1810 3.7988 
R(7,7) 4573.778 0.17964 3.7572 
R(7,8) 4534.322 0.17893 3.7409 
R(7,9) 4478.132 0.17988 3.7177 
 The statistical findings for transition revenue show an inequitable distribution. 
The permissible variance had a high of 0.2555 in 2006, but dropped to a score of 0.17988 
in 2012. The coefficient of variation had scores ranging from a high of 4.08 in 2007 and a 
low of 3.7177 in 2012. The ideal equity value for the coefficient of variation is zero. The 
values detailed above show a wide range of disbursement across the state. 
As a result of these findings, Null-Hypothesis 6 was accepted. 
84 
Null-Hypothesis 7: On a statewide basis, an equitable distribution of the 
referendum revenue will not be observed between 2003 and 2012. 
 Referendum revenue is an equalized revenue source based on a school district’s 
local referendum levy. The first $700 per pupil of a district’s referendum levy is 
equalized at $476,000 per pupil of referendum market value. Any amount over $700 is 
equalized at $270,000 per pupil of referendum capped at $1,576.35 per pupil for fiscal 
year 2012. A school district only received referendum funding if it passes a voter 
approved referendum levy. 301 school districts had a local referendum levy during fiscal 
year 2012. 
Results: Table 10 details the statistical findings in terms of referendum levy. 
Table 10. Fiscal Equity Analysis of the Referendum Revenue. 
 Referendum 
Variance 
Referendum 
Permissible 
Variance 
Referendum Coefficient 
of Variation 
R(8,0) 133365.756 0.2550 1.1202 
R(8,1) 176871.871 0.2725 1.0232 
R(8,2) 166773.337 0.3713 0.7945 
R(8,3) 158206.235 0.4513 0.6718 
R(8,4) 186135.061 0.5283 0.6353 
R(8,5) 205501.427 0.4798 0.6192 
R(8,6) 258286.581 0.5032 0.6221 
R(8,7) 326058.820 0.5583 0.6773 
R(8,8) 323812.327 0.5471 0.6437 
R(8,9) 321282.874 0.5601 0.6270 
  
The findings for both the permissible variance and the coefficient of variation 
show an increase in equity over the fiscal years 2003 to 2012. Perfect equity occurs at 1.0 
85 
for permissible variance and 0.0 for coefficient of variance as specified in the statistical 
definitions. As indicated above, although neither statistical measure is close to perfect 
equity, both are improving. Figure 3 shows a linear regression of the permissible 
variance. 
 
 
Figure 3. Permissible Variance Regression. 
The figure indicates that if the permissible variance keeps increasing at the 2003-
2012 rate, it will reach a score of 0.9 in fiscal year 2020, contingent upon no future 
modifications to the formula.  
Based on these findings, null-hypothesis is accepted; although, referendum 
revenue is showing improvement. 
Null-Hypothesis 8: On a statewide basis, the wealth neutrality of the total general 
revenue distribution will not be observable between 2003 and 2012. 
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 The measure for wealth neutrality that was used is the Gini Coefficient, also 
known as the Gini Index. This tool examines the dispersion of two different variables, in 
this case the distribution of per pupil revenues and the distribution of wealth measure of 
per pupil property valuations.  
Results: Results of the analysis are shown in Figure 3 as values from zero to one. 
A value of zero indicates perfect equity. 
Table 11. Wealth Neutrality Analysis of the Total General Revenue. 
     Gini Coefficient 
R(8,0) 0.01624 
R(8,1) 0.00980 
R(8,2) 0.00607 
R(8,3) 0.00577 
R(8,4) 0.00622 
R(8,5) 0.00579 
R(8,6) 0.00529 
R(8,7) 0.00670 
R(8,8) 0.00578 
R(8,9) 0.00550 
 
 Over the 10-year period, the Gini Coefficient indicated a progression towards 
equity. Fiscal year 2003 had an index score of 0.01624, while 2012 improved to 0.00550. 
The trend data indicates index scores that were decreasing over time and approaching 
zero; therefore, the wealth neutrality of the total general revenue distribution was 
observed. 
Because of this data, Null-Hypothesis 8 was not accepted. 
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Summary of Findings 
1. Null-Hypothesis 1 was accepted as an equitable distribution of the basic 
general formula revenue was observed. 
2. Null-Hypothesis 2 was accepted as an equitable distribution of the basic skills 
revenue was not observed. 
3. Null-Hypothesis 3 was accepted as an equitable distribution of training and 
experience revenue was not observed. 
4. Null-Hypothesis 4 was accepted as an equitable distribution of the sparsity 
revenue was not observed. 
5. Null-Hypothesis 5 was not accepted as an equitable distribution of the equity 
revenue was observed. 
6. Null-Hypothesis 6 was accepted as an equitable distribution of the transition 
revenue was not observed. 
7. Null-Hypothesis 7 was accepted as an equitable distribution of the referendum 
revenue was not observed. 
8. Null-Hypothesis 8 was not accepted as the wealth neutrality of the total 
general revenue distribution was not observed. 
Based on these findings, the basic general formula revenue and the equity revenue 
were the only sources that indicated equitable distribution. In addition, the total general 
revenue distribution did indicate wealth neutrality. Of the revenue sources studied, the 
training and experience revenue proved to be the most inequitable funding source, but it 
was repealed beginning with the 2012 fiscal year. 
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 The final chapter details the recommendations that are being presented as a result 
of this data. 
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Chapter IV detailed the findings of the fiscal equity and wealth neutrality 
statistical analysis. The fiscal equity of several revenue sources was analyzed using the 
statistical tools of variance, permissible variance, and coefficient of variation. The wealth 
neutrality of the total general education funding was analyzed using the Gini Coefficient. 
 Chapter V consists of four sections; a summary of the findings from the research 
conducted and conclusions that can be drawn on those findings, a historical review of the 
Minnesota Fiscal Equity like statistical findings from the four previous equity studies 
completed on the Minnesota funding formula, an analysis of the previous studies’ 
recommendations and how they compare to the 2011-12 Minnesota funding formula, and 
this researcher’s recommendations based on the trend data, historically comparative data, 
and previous equity study recommendations.  
Summary of Findings 
Basic General Formula Revenue 
The most equitable revenue source was the basic revenue, which was expected as 
the basic revenue is a foundation payment. Each school gets the same amount of funding 
per WADM.  This would be an example of a horizontal equity payment that does not take 
the individual characteristics of the students, demographics, location, etc. into account. 
For the 2011-12 school year, the foundation payment was $5,224 per student. The 
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question remains whether or not the current foundation level is an adequate amount in 
order to meet the accountability standards that are placed upon school districts. 
Basic Skills Revenue 
The basic skills revenue is broken into two sub-categories for disbursement: 
compensatory, which is based on the school’s number of students that qualify for free or 
reduced lunches and limited English proficiency (LEP), which is dependent upon the 
number of LEP students in a school’s district. Both of these sub-categories fall under the 
standards of vertical equity as additional funding is given to offset the extra costs 
associated with educating these sub-groups.  
The statistical analysis showed both the basic skills components are distributed 
inequitably on a statewide basis, but they have shown a gradual progress over the years 
analyzed as well. However, these categorical revenue sources are specifically designed to 
help alleviate the additional pressures involved with some sub-groups. Looking at these 
revenue sources individually does not take into account the true purpose they serve in the 
overall Minnesota funding formula which is to provide vertical equity to the sub groups 
where additional support is needed to meet their educational needs. 
Training and Experience Revenue (T & E) 
The T & E revenue was found to be the most inequitable funding source analyzed. 
The legislature repealed the T & E revenue beginning in fiscal year 2012 due to 
legislative manipulation of the revenue category. The original intent was to offer 
assistance to the metro school districts as it cost more to pay teachers with greater years 
of experience and costs of living. 
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Sparsity Revenue 
Sparsity revenue was found to be an inequitable funding source on a statewide 
basis; however, the purpose of the sparsity category is to help isolated school districts 
that may be facing declining enrollment, a situation, which leads to a decline in basic 
education funding. Declining enrollment; however, does not necessarily lead to declining 
costs. For example, a district experiencing declining enrollment might not see a decline in 
transportation costs as many of these districts have large geographical areas. The 
inclusion of sparsity revenue in the funding formula can be classified as an attempt at 
vertical equity and should be kept in the funding structure. 
Equity Revenue 
Equity revenue is a three-tier system. The first tier can be categorized as 
foundation type revenue as every school district receives a portion of the equity payment. 
The following tier is an equalized revenue source based on local districts taxing ability to 
raise a set level amount. The local district’s equity index is compared to the 95th 
percentile index, with the difference equalized at a rate of the difference times a set dollar 
amount. Lastly, the third tier is a supplementary payment made specifically to school 
districts whose referendum amount is below 10% of the state average referendum 
amount. From 2008 to 2012, equity revenue had a permissible value index between 
0.7837 and 0.7363. The coefficient of variation trend data also showed a statistical 
decrease, from a 0.5605 in 2004 to a 0.2825 in 2012.  
These results lead to a finding that the equity revenue source is working as an 
equitable distribution on a statewide scale as the data is approaching an equitable 
distribution in both statistical measurements respectfully.  In fact, the equity revenue 
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category of the Minnesota funding formula allocated the funds more equitable than any 
other revenue source excluding the basic general revenue category. The intent of this 
particular category is to provide supplemental resources to school districts where their tax 
base may be considered property poor; however, this revenue source is tied directly to the 
ability of a local school district to pass a levy referendum. 
Transition Revenue 
This revenue source was created due to funding formula modifications as the 
result of a 2003 amendment by the Minnesota legislature. This source is a good example 
of “inequitable equilibrium” that was discussed in Chapter II. In regard to transition 
revenue, the permissible variance had a high of 0.2555 in 2005, but dropped to a score of 
0.17988 in 2012. The coefficient of variation had scores ranging from a high of 4.0833 in 
2007 and a low of 3.7177 in 2012. The statistical findings for transition revenue show an 
inequitable distribution. 
Referendum Revenue 
Referendum revenue is an equalized revenue source based on a school district’s 
local referendum levy. A school district only receives referendum funding if it passes a 
voter approved referendum levy. Overall, the referendum levy was found to be 
inequitable; although, both the permissible variance and the coefficient of variation were 
making progress during the fiscal years that were studied. However, the linear regression 
model showed that in regard to permissible variance, a scale index of 0.9 would not be 
achieved until after the year 2020, providing there is no future legislative modifications to 
the referendum component. A main concern with referendum revenue is that it is 
dependent on local voters passing a referendum levy. If the local voters do not pass the 
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levy, those school districts are not eligible; however, 90% of school districts had an 
operating local referendum levy in 2012. 
Wealth Neutrality 
In regard to the wealth neutrality of the total general education revenue statewide, 
the results were very positive. A Gini Coefficient index approaching zero is desirable for 
perfect equity. The Gini index over the past eight years had a mean score of 0.00589. 
This finding suggests that overall the Minnesota funding formula is distributing the funds 
equitably throughout the state.  This is important as again the definition of wealth 
neutrality states “the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other 
than the wealth of the state as a whole” (Coons, Clune III, & Sugarman, 1970, p.2). 
Historical Review of Minnesota Fiscal Equity Studies 
Previously, four equity studies have been conducted on the Minnesota funding of 
k-12 public schools. Carruth completed the first study based on projections made during 
the 1980 fiscal year, Wilson analyzed fiscal year 1985, Jacobson based his study on fiscal 
year 1985, and Vandal focused on fiscal year 1994. This section will review the statistical 
findings of like data elements over that time period, including findings that are 
representative of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2012. 
Basic General Formula Revenue 
 None of the previous researchers analyzed the basic funding revenue source. This 
researcher chose to include it in order to provide an example of what a revenue source 
that is approaching perfect equity would look like.  
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Sparsity Revenue 
The first common revenue source analyzed was the sparsity index. Table 12 
represents the findings from all four researchers. 
Table 12. Historical Comparison of the Equitable Distribution of the Sparsity Revenue. 
 
Researcher Variance Permissible Variance Coefficient of Variation 
Carruth    
Wilson 3182.000  0.6100 
Jacobson 750.745 -0.0110 2.6800 
Vandal 2351.730 - 7.76687 
Larson 52754.334 - 1.3050 
- = Permissible variance could not be calculated as the state had a median = 0 
 Overall, the results are statistically similar in regard to the disbursement of 
sparsity revenue. The variance over the years has increased drastically as the amount of 
revenue has increased. The coefficient of variation has also increased, which is a sign that 
the sparsity revenue inequity may be improving. Again, only approximately one-third of 
the 333 public school districts in Minnesota receive sparsity revenue and the intent of the 
sparsity revenue is to provide support to the smaller districts in a sense of a form of 
vertical equity. 
Training and Experience Revenue 
The research conducted by Carruth (1980) and Wilson (1985) did not include any 
training and experience funding. Table 13 represents the historical trends of the training 
and experience revenue for the remaining three studies.  
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Table 13. Historical Comparison of the Equitable Distribution of the Training and 
Experience Revenue. 
 
Researcher Variance Permissible Variance Coefficient of Variance 
Carruth     
Wilson     
Jacobson  1820.516 0.5988 0.6000 
Vandal  715.559 0.8200 0.4030 
Larson  14.661 - 3.8291 
-: Permissible variance could not be collected as the state had a median = 0 
Note: Larson data is based upon fiscal year 2011 
 
 The training and experience revenue statistics from this research showed an 
increase in equity from the Jacobson (1986) and Vandal (1997) studies. In fact, the 
Vandal study recommended the continuation and the expansion of the revenue source as 
his data found it to be fiscally equitable. Based on legislative modifications to the 
revenue formula that have occurred over time, the training and experience revenue 
became increasingly inequitable and the category was repealed by the state legislature 
completely beginning in fiscal year 2012.  The impact of the training and experience 
revenue from legislative manipulation over the years is an example of the inequitable 
equilibrium that Meltzer (2003) discussed. 
Compensatory Revenue 
Another like revenue sources that was analyzed historically was the compensatory 
revenue, which is calculated separately based on a school district’s free and reduced 
lunch count. It is included in the basic skills revenue along with the LEP sub-category. 
For comparative purposes, only the compensatory component is included in Table 14. 
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Table 14. Historical Comparison of the Equitable Distribution of the Compensatory 
Revenue. 
 
Researcher Variance Permissible Variance Coefficient of Variation 
Carruth     
Wilson  3528.000 0.6465 1.3700 
Jacobson     
Vandal  34274.760 0.4731 1.7419 
Larson  211753.560 0.4998 0.9278 
  
Historically, the statistical analysis of the compensatory revenue had similar 
findings. As the demographics have changed over time, the variance has increased. The 
permissible variance between Vandal (1997) and Larson (2014) were statistically equal. 
The coefficient of variation was also in a similar range across the Wilson (1985), Vandal, 
and Larson studies. This has been an attempt at vertical equity and is a needed revenue 
source to fund specific sub-groups that historically cost more to educate than other sub-
groups.  
Total Combined Revenue 
The final like data element that was analyzed for comparison purposes was the 
total combined revenue. Table 15 represents the results of wealth neutrality based on the 
Gini Coefficient. 
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Table 15. Historical Comparison of Wealth Neutrality Measures. 
Researcher Gini Coefficient 
Carruth 0.0170 
Wilson 0.0440 
Jacobson 0.0200 
Vandal -0.0889 
Larson 0.0055 
 
Analysis of Research Recommendations from Previous Minnesota Equity Studies 
This section addressed recommendations that were proposed by each of the four 
previous researchers and determine if they are still applicable with the 2011-12 
Minnesota funding formula and the findings of this study.  
Carruth (1980) 
The Carruth (1980) study had two recommendations that can still be considered 
valid today. In regard to basic revenue, Carruth recommended continued, careful 
monitoring of the basic revenue to ensure a situation as close to perfect equity as 
possible. The analysis of fiscal years 2003-2012 done by this researcher validated that 
recommendation. In regard to sparsity revenue, Carruth recommended repealing the 
category altogether. Although this study found the revenue source to still be statistically 
inequitable, it is a needed component of the overall funding structure in Minnesota. 
Schools with declining enrollment and large geographical areas rely on that funding.  
When looking at the state funding level as a whole, the sparsity revenue did not have a 
large impact on the overall fiscal equity. 
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 Carruth (1980) also had recommendations for future study that connected to the 
2011-12 funding formula, one of which was to study the decreasing fiscal neutrality tied 
to declining enrollment. Transition revenue and small schools revenue in the 2011-12 
funding formula both have components that tie to declining enrollment. Carruth also 
recommended future adequacy studies. Two such studies were conducted in Minnesota, 
but none of the findings from those adequacy studies were implemented. 
Wilson (1984) 
Wilson’s (1984) recommendations were not sustained as those of Carruth (1980). 
Wilson recommended repealing all revenue sources that were not available to all schools. 
Based on the current funding formula, that would include small schools, sparsity, 
compensatory, and LEP. Wilson also recommended a study on the adequacy of 
Minnesota funding. 
Jacobson (1986) 
Jacobson’s (1986) study centered on the five-tier system, which is currently not in 
existence, leaving a majority of his recommendations not applicable. He also had 
recommendations regarding optimum school size and available revenues, both of which 
tie into an adequacy funding study. 
Vandal (1997) 
Vandal’s (1997) major recommendation was the continuation and expansion of 
the training and experience revenue. That revenue source was shown to be increasingly 
inequitable and was repealed beginning in fiscal year 2012. Vandal also recommended 
phasing out any excess levy by 2000. This has not happened and this researcher identified 
there is currently more of a dependence on local levy referendums. The statistical 
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findings of this research validated Vandal’s concerns. Like the previous three researchers, 
Vandal also recommended conducting an adequacy study. 
Recommendations 
Through a statistical analysis of the trend data and a historical look at equity over 
the past thirty years, this researcher is proposing several recommendations to the 
Minnesota Legislature as well as recommendations for future research studies. They are 
presented in no particular order of importance.  
Recommendations to Minnesota Legislature 
1. Because 90% of Minnesota school districts now have local referendum levies, 
the state should reinstate the statewide general education levy and roll that 
amount into the basic revenue, repealing the referendum levy. School districts 
should be allowed to raise local funds to expand their programs, but levies 
should not be needed to meet minimum standards.  Beginning FY 2014, the 
state re-implemented a small general education levy called Student 
Achievement Levy (Crowe, 2011).  This was based off districts ANTC and was 
set a rate of 0.35%, a far distance from the amount in 2001 (32.38%) before 
the roll in.  Also beginning in fiscal year 2014, the legislature provided school 
board authority to have referendum levels up to $300 per pupil without going 
to the voters (Crowe, 2011).  For school districts with a referendum, the 
district could allocate a portion of the referendum as location equity based on 
the student population of the district.  For the seven county metro school 
districts, they could allocate $424 of the referendum as location equity; 
districts with student populations of greater than 2,000 students could allocate 
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$212 as location equity.  Schools with a student population of less than 1,000 
were getting funding through small schools revenue.  This created what was 
known as the “donut hole” as districts with student populations greater than 
1,000 and less than 2,000 did not receive any support in their referendum.  To 
offset the “donut hole” concern, beginning in fiscal year 2016 the Legislature 
gave authority to all school districts to allocate $424 as location equity, which 
was, renamed Local Option Referendum.  This gave the school district 
authority to have a referendum up to $724 per pupil and not need voter 
approval.  Essentially, this took away local control, which I believe is a step 
toward true equity.  School districts do have the ability to request from voter’s 
approval to go above and beyond the $724 per pupil level. 
2. Overall, the 2011-12 Minnesota Funding formula was found to be wealth 
neutral based on the distribution of revenue sources. The equity measure 
needs to be continually monitored to ensure the state continued on its current 
path and as Jeffrey Metzler discussed the “Inequitable Equilibrium” of the 
legislature is not having a negative impact of the fiscal equity. Less attention 
can be paid to the individual categories of the formula as long as the state is 
meeting equitable distribution standards as a whole. 
3. Minnesota Legislature needs to stop the practice of holding funds from 
Minnesota schools. This practice puts local schools in the position of needing 
to borrow money in order to meet the minimum standards set forth by the 
state.  However, the state needs to ensure their general fund balances are 
replenished and the reserve balance is restored to ensure the practice of 
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holding funds from school districts does not occur again.  For fiscal year 2014 
the state did transition back to the 90-10 structure and has paid back all of the 
revenue it held back to school districts.  This payback and transition back to 
the 90-10 funding structure is a direct relation to the state’s economic 
improvement.  
4. Minnesota needs to look at the politics of the Minnesota funding formula to 
ensure all future amendments to the funding formula will continue to meet the 
fiscal equity standards.  This political gamesmanship and tampering of the 
funding formula fixes some issues, but causes future losers as well.  The 
“donut hole” was an example of this political manipulation.    
Recommendations for Future Studies 
1. The basic revenue is nearing perfect equity, as measured by the basic general 
formula revenue.  A future study should be conducted regarding whether per 
pupil foundation amount meets the minimum standard needed to reach 
growing accountability standards in Minnesota.  Equity has been achieved, but 
the need to research whether the funding levels are at an adequate level to 
meet the growing demands has yet to be studied. 
2. The only way to reach true equity is through a full state-funding plan. 
Minnesota’s funding structure is currently a mix of foundation aid and 
equalization.  The concern is the loss of local control, but this practice is what 
can cause inequity.  The referendum revenue is an example of this as districts 
with voter approval have much greater revenue to provide an education than 
those districts where the voters do not approve a referendum.  Again, the 
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board authority of approving $724 per pupil limits the local control; however, 
there will still be school districts that have the ability to approve referendums 
much higher than the $724 level.  The variance should be improved with this 
legislative change; however, there will still be a gap in per pupil revenue.  
Future study on moving toward full state funding should be conducted. 
3. An updated adequacy cost-out study should be conducted on the funding of 
Minnesota k-12 public schools to determine the minimum standard. This 
would allow the Legislature to determine what action needs to be taken to 
meet this standard.  The distribution of revenue overall shows fiscal equity; 
however, you can have an equitable system but not an adequate system 
leaving the local school districts again to rely on the taxpayers to pass a 
referendum higher than the amount the school board has the authority to 
approve leading to inequity across school districts. 
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